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STAR mono-raise-delete — part 2: raise X, delete Y-below-X, X loses

Bucket — APPROVAL_OR_MINOR: Only Approval differs

Generated by STARVote_LH_tabulation_engine/tools_adam/scripts/build_divergence_index.py — rebuilt from the election file; do not hand-edit.

What happens

STAR, RCV-IRV and Ranked Robin all agree on Z. Only Approval differs, electing X: Approval counts every score of 3–5 as one equal 'approve' and ignores intensity, rewarding X's breadth of acceptability over Z's stronger but more concentrated support. A threshold story about Approval, not a STAR-vs-IRV teaching case.

Winners by method

Method Winner
STAR Z
RCV-IRV Z
Ranked Robin (RCV-RR) Z
Approval X
Range / Score X
Condorcet Z

Flags: none

Source election: method_comparisons/monotonicity/cases/mono_raise_delete_after.yaml · STAR tabulated mirror: mono_raise_delete_after_tabulated.txt

3 candidates, 30 ballots.

The ballots

Each row is a group of identical score ballots (0 = no support, 5 = max).

Count X Y Z
12 5 4 0
9 4 0 5
9 0 2 3

STAR result (official)

Scoring round (sum of scores): X 96, Z 72, Y 66

Finalists (top two): X and Z

Automatic runoff: X 12 vs Z 18

STAR winner: Z

Full LH STAR engine report:

--- Runoff (Preference) Matrix ---
Head-to-head / pairwise comparison
Legend: For - Equal Support - Against
        * indicates Top 2 Finalist
                 |     * X      |    * Z      |
-----------------------------------------------
           * X > |     ---      |12 -  0 - 18 |
           * Z > | 18 -  0 - 12 |    ---      |

[Divergence from STAR]
  STAR     = Z
  Approval = X   (differs from STAR)

[Runoff Reversal]
 - Score Round Winner(s) = (X)
 - Runoff Round Winner   = (Z)
  Candidate X earned the highest total score, but
  Candidate Z won the automatic runoff — not a malfunction,
  STAR working as designed: the runoff elects the finalist preferred
  by the majority (of voters with a preference).


--- STAR Voting Method (single winner) ---
 Tabulating 30 ballots.
Count × X,Y,Z
   12 × 5,4,0
    9 × 4,0,5
    9 × 0,2,3

[Score Distribution] (how many ballots gave each star rating)
                   Score
Candidate   5   4   3   2   1   0  | Total   Avg
X          12   9   0   0   0   9  |    96   3.2
Y           0  12   0   9   0   9  |    66   2.2
Z           9   0   9   0   0  12  |    72   2.4

Scoring Round
 The two highest-scoring candidates advance to the next round.
   X             -- 96 -- First place
   Z             -- 72 -- Second place
   Y             -- 66
 X and Z advance.

Automatic Runoff Round
 The candidate preferred in the most head-to-head matchups wins.
   Z             -- 18 -- First place
   X             -- 12
   Equal Support --  0
 Z wins.
   Voters with a preference: 30 of 30 (no Equal Support).
   Z 18 (60%) vs X 12 (40%); majority = 16.

Winner — STAR Voting Method (single winner)
 Z

RCV-IRV — round by round

--- RCV / Instant-Runoff Voting (single winner) ---
 Tabulating 30 ballots (converted from score ballots; 0 = unranked, equal scores broken by candidate priority).

Ballots:
   the ranking RCV-IRV reads (0 = unranked, equal scores broken by priority);
   the source score ballot follows in () per column: X, Y, Z
    12 ×   X > Y      (5, 4, 0)
     9 ×   Z > X      (4, 0, 5)
     9 ×   Z > Y      (0, 2, 3)

FINAL RESULT
Candidate      Votes  Status
-----------  -------  --------
Z                 18  Elected
X                 12  Rejected
Y                  0  Rejected


Winner(s) — RCV / Instant-Runoff Voting (single winner)
  Z

--- Smith Set (the generalized Condorcet winner) ---
The smallest group whose every member beats every candidate outside it —
the honest answer to "who is even in contention?".
   Smith set (1 of 3): Z
   Outside (2):        X, Y
   One member ⇒ Z is the Condorcet winner, beating every rival head-to-head.
   RCV-IRV winner Z is INSIDE the Smith set. ✓
      Not guaranteed — RCV-IRV is not Smith-efficient — but it holds here.
   More: 07_Concepts/topics/smith_set.md

NOTE: a generated cross-method view of the STAR ballots, for comparison only — not the official STAR result.

Ranked Robin (RCV-RR) — every pair, head-to-head

--- Ranked Robin (RCV-RR / Copeland) Method (single winner) ---
 Tabulating 30 ballots (score ballots).

Ballots:
   the ranking Ranked Robin reads ("=" = tied); source scores follow in () per column: X, Y, Z
    12 × X > Y > Z      (5, 4, 0)
     9 × Z > X > Y      (4, 0, 5)
     9 × Z > Y > X      (0, 2, 3)

Round-Robin — every pair, head-to-head (For – Against):
   X  beats Y   21 –  9
   Z  beats X   18 – 12
   Z  beats Y   18 – 12

--- Pairwise (Round-Robin) Matrix ---
Head-to-head / pairwise comparison — the Ranked Robin tally
Legend: For - Equal Support - Against   (row vs column)
      |      X       |     Y       |     Z       |
--------------------------------------------------
  X > |     ---      |21 -  0 -  9 |12 -  0 - 18 |
  Y > |  9 -  0 - 21 |    ---      |12 -  0 - 18 |
  Z > | 18 -  0 - 12 |18 -  0 - 12 |    ---      |

Win–loss record — Copeland score = wins + ½·ties (highest score wins; ties broken by total margin, then lot order):
    #  Candidate  W–L–T  Copeland  Margin  Beats
    1  Z          2–0–0         2     +12  X, Y
    2  X          1–1–0         1      +6  Y
    3  Y          0–2–0         0     -18  —

Winner — Ranked Robin (RCV-RR): Z
   beats every opponent head-to-head — the Condorcet winner.

--- Smith Set (the generalized Condorcet winner) ---
The smallest group whose every member beats every candidate outside it —
the honest answer to "who is even in contention?".
   Smith set (1 of 3): Z
   Outside (2):        X, Y
   One member ⇒ Z is the Condorcet winner, beating every rival head-to-head.
   Ranked Robin (RCV-RR) winner Z is INSIDE the Smith set. ✓
      Guaranteed: Ranked Robin (Copeland) is Smith-efficient — every member of
      the set outscores every outsider, so the top of the win–loss table is
      always inside the set, however the tie among them is then broken.
   More: 07_Concepts/topics/smith_set.md