Browse by tag

The cross-cutting index. The folders answer "which method?" — this page answers "what kind of question?", which is the axis a folder tree cannot show.

Nine tags, applied to the cross-method concept pages and to the approval committee criteria — the two sets of pages that answer a question rather than describe a method. A page carries at most three; a folder's own README.md carries none, since it is the folder index rather than a page about anything.

Tag	What it gathers
foundations	what are we even optimizing for — before any criterion
reform	the case for changing the system, and what's wrong with the current one
ballots	what a ballot lets a voter say, and what the count reads from it
criteria	properties a method passes or fails
theory	theorems, impossibility results, the formal machinery
strategy	manipulation, burial, favorite betrayal, honest-vote incentives
multi-winner	more than one seat — majoritarian and proportional
simulation	VSE, spatial models, and where quantitative claims come from
people	organizations, who's who, and how to learn more

Deliberately not tagged by method. This is a STAR library, so a STAR tag would land on two-thirds of these pages and filter nothing — and per-method browsing is already the job of the method folders (01_STAR, 02_STAR_Bloc, 03_STAR_PR, 04_Approval, 05_Ranked_Robin, 06_Other). Tags carry the axis those folders can't.

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administration

• Election systems at organization scale — the government architecture, shrunk

ballots

• "Preference" — the Word That Causes Half the Confusion
• 3-2-1 Voting — the "Good / OK / Bad" method, and how it compares to STAR
• Alternate ballot styles — one voter, three ballots
• Ballot & Terminology Basics
• Central Tabulation — When Every Ballot Must Travel
• How the Count Works — STAR vs RCV-IRV, Step by Step
• Pairwise Counting — Every Ballot Is a Tiny Matrix
• Same opinions, every method — the line-up
• Scoring Methods vs. Ranked Voting
• The ranked-ballot method zoo — many ways to count one ranked ballot
• What Is a Voting Method? — Ballot vs Count, Plurality vs Majority
• What a method reads — the informational basis of a voting rule
• What is a voting method? — a ballot and a count

criteria

• "One person, one vote" — the legal principle, and the reformer's stronger claim
• Cardinal utility — the number a score ballot is reaching for
• Committee monotonicity — add a seat, keep the winner
• Condorcet committees — the criterion that usually has nothing to satisfy
• Consistency — two electorates that agree should keep agreeing
• Continuous model, discrete ballot — the encoding step
• Counting under encryption — can a STAR election be tallied without opening the ballots?
• Criteria at a glance — Approval, STAR, Ranked Robin, RCV-IRV
• Distortion — the formal price of a ranked ballot
• Distributed voting — the measured price of counting by district
• Do the experts really think RCV-IRV is "bad"? — grading a common claim
• Does Arrow's Impossibility Theorem apply to STAR? — ranked vs. rated
• FairVote's claims, checked — a standing ledger
• Formal compliance vs. strategic preservation of the sincere winner
• Inclusion-strategyproofness — the column where AV stands alone
• Misrepresentation — the measure that hands Borda the trophy, and why that's the lesson
• Ordinal vs. cardinal, as mechanism design — Kim's answer to "but they'll exaggerate"
• PVSI — the Pivotal Voter Strategic Incentive
• Pareto efficiency — can a rule elect a committee everybody would trade away?
• Resignation monotonicity — a winner resigns; can the count throw out someone who stayed?
• Simulate utilities, not ballots — the right primitive for comparing methods
• Social welfare function — the object Arrow's theorem is actually about
• Support monotonicity — can more approvals cost you your seat?
• The Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem — why no method is strategy-proof
• The Smith Set — the Smallest Club That Beats Everyone Outside It
• The cycle–cocycle decomposition — how much of an election is rock-paper-scissors?
• The spatial model — voters and candidates as points on a map
• The statistics you actually need to read voting research
• The strategic pathologies — five "Molochs," and where STAR stands
• The uncovered set — "you're beaten by someone who beats everyone you beat"
• Tournament solutions — the theory of the win-loss graph
• Variance — the statistical name for "divisive"

foundations

• AI advice — the library's know-it-all is asked to pick a voting method
• Election simulation models — how voters and ballots are generated for testing
• Statistical cultures — the named recipes for generating a random election
• The mathematics of social choice — what to study, in what order
• The six Euclidean spaces — where a simulated electorate's voters come from
• What makes a "good" winner? — the correct winner, the consensus candidate, and why there's no single ideal
• What makes a voting method good? — criteria beyond the winner

multi-winner

• Committee monotonicity — add a seat, keep the winner
• Comparing multi-winner methods — change one thing at a time
• Computational complexity — why the rules people deploy are the ones that fail axioms
• Condorcet committees — the criterion that usually has nothing to satisfy
• Consistency — two electorates that agree should keep agreeing
• Electing more than one, simply — majoritarian vs. proportional
• False majorities — when a legislature's majority isn't one
• Inclusion-strategyproofness — the column where AV stands alone
• Pareto efficiency — can a rule elect a committee everybody would trade away?
• Quorum — did enough of the electorate show up?
• Resignation monotonicity — a winner resigns; can the count throw out someone who stayed?
• Support monotonicity — can more approvals cost you your seat?
• The mathematics of social choice — what to study, in what order
• Two-Party Dominance — the case for it, the case against, and what actually changes it

people

• Advocacy organizations — who champions each method
• Choosing Among the Equal Vote Methods — STAR, Approval, Ranked Robin
• How to Learn About Voting Methods — a reading path
• In memoriam — Jameson Quinn (1974–2025)
• Who's who in voting methods — a sourced reference

reform

• Does a better ballot end political polarization? — the median-voter convergence argument, and its limits
• FairVote's claims, checked — a standing ledger
• False majorities — when a legislature's majority isn't one
• Our Voting System Is Broken — The Problem with Plurality
• Plurality — Choose-One / First-Past-The-Post
• RCV-IRV vs. STAR — A Side-by-Side
• Strategic Voting Across the Equal Vote Methods
• The problem, in four causes — where a voter's influence actually gets lost
• The spoiler effect
• Two-Party Dominance — the case for it, the case against, and what actually changes it
• Wasted Votes — what the phrase actually means (four senses), and how each method fares
• Why STAR Voting

simulation

• A reproduction command nobody runs — what auditing vse-sim turned up
• AI advice — the library's know-it-all is asked to pick a voting method
• Continuous model, discrete ballot — the encoding step
• Distortion — the formal price of a ranked ballot
• Do the experts really think RCV-IRV is "bad"? — grading a common claim
• Election simulation models — how voters and ballots are generated for testing
• Formal compliance vs. strategic preservation of the sincere winner
• PVSI — the Pivotal Voter Strategic Incentive
• Simulate utilities, not ballots — the right primitive for comparing methods
• Statistical cultures — the named recipes for generating a random election
• The six Euclidean spaces — where a simulated electorate's voters come from
• The spatial model — voters and candidates as points on a map
• The statistics you actually need to read voting research
• What makes a "good" winner? — the correct winner, the consensus candidate, and why there's no single ideal
• What makes a voting method good? — criteria beyond the winner
• vse-sim — the simulator behind the VSE numbers, read from source

strategy

• AI advice — the library's know-it-all is asked to pick a voting method
• Does Arrow's Impossibility Theorem apply to STAR? — ranked vs. rated
• Formal compliance vs. strategic preservation of the sincere winner
• Inclusion-strategyproofness — the column where AV stands alone
• Ordinal vs. cardinal, as mechanism design — Kim's answer to "but they'll exaggerate"
• PVSI — the Pivotal Voter Strategic Incentive
• Strategic Voting Across the Equal Vote Methods
• The Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem — why no method is strategy-proof
• The strategic pathologies — five "Molochs," and where STAR stands
• What makes a voting method good? — criteria beyond the winner
• Why STAR Voting
• vse-sim — the simulator behind the VSE numbers, read from source

theory

• "One person, one vote" — the legal principle, and the reformer's stronger claim
• Cardinal utility — the number a score ballot is reaching for
• Computational complexity — why the rules people deploy are the ones that fail axioms
• Condorcet committees — the criterion that usually has nothing to satisfy
• Consistency — two electorates that agree should keep agreeing
• Criteria at a glance — Approval, STAR, Ranked Robin, RCV-IRV
• Distortion — the formal price of a ranked ballot
• Do the experts really think RCV-IRV is "bad"? — grading a common claim
• Does Arrow's Impossibility Theorem apply to STAR? — ranked vs. rated
• Does a better ballot end political polarization? — the median-voter convergence argument, and its limits
• Election systems at organization scale — the government architecture, shrunk
• May's Theorem — why two candidates are easy, and everything hard starts at three
• Misrepresentation — the measure that hands Borda the trophy, and why that's the lesson
• Ordinal vs. cardinal, as mechanism design — Kim's answer to "but they'll exaggerate"
• Resignation monotonicity — a winner resigns; can the count throw out someone who stayed?
• Social welfare function — the object Arrow's theorem is actually about
• The Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem — why no method is strategy-proof
• The mathematics of social choice — what to study, in what order
• The strategic pathologies — five "Molochs," and where STAR stands
• The uncovered set — "you're beaten by someone who beats everyone you beat"
• Tournament solutions — the theory of the win-loss graph
• Variance — the statistical name for "divisive"
• Why STAR Voting