====================================================================== SOURCE FILE: mono_raise_delete_after.yaml TABULATED FILE: mono_raise_delete_after_tabulated.txt ====================================================================== election_title: "STAR mono-raise-delete — part 2: raise X, delete Y-below-X, X loses" scenario_description: |- Part 2 of the STAR mono-raise-delete pair. The ONLY change from part 1 (mono_raise_delete_before.yaml): on the nine ballots that read Z>X>Y (Z=5, X=3, Y=2, i.e. "3,2,5"), X is raised from 3 to 4 and the one candidate now below X — Y — is deleted (dropped to 0). Those ballots become Z=5, X=4, Y=0 ("4,0,5"). Z stays above X and is untouched, exactly as mono-raise-delete prescribes ("delete all candidates now below X"). Effect: burying Y drops its total from 84 to 66, below Z's 72, so the finalists change from {X, Y} to {X, Z}. X still leads the scoring round (now 96), but the runoff is X vs Z, and Z beats X 18-12. X went from winning to losing after being raised — STAR fails the mono-raise-delete criterion (Woodall 1996). It still passes plain mono-raise (see the monotonicity_star_* pair, where the same kind of change leaves X winning). Concept: 01_STAR/01_Learn/properties_and_limits/STAR_monotonicity.md. paradoxes: [non-monotonicity] voting_method: STAR num_winners: 1 # The only change from part 1 is the middle bloc: "3,2,5" -> "4,0,5" # (X raised 3->4; Y, now below X, deleted to 0; Z unchanged, still above X). ballots: |- X,Y,Z 12: 5,4,0 9: 4,0,5 9: 0,2,3 expected_winners: - Z # file: mono_raise_delete_after.yaml ====================================================================== TABULATION RESULTS ====================================================================== === STAR mono-raise-delete — part 2: raise X, delete Y-below-X, X loses === Part 2 of the STAR mono-raise-delete pair. The ONLY change from part 1 (mono_raise_delete_before.yaml): on the nine ballots that read Z>X>Y (Z=5, X=3, Y=2, i.e. "3,2,5"), X is raised from 3 to 4 and the one candidate now below X — Y — is deleted (dropped to 0). Those ballots become Z=5, X=4, Y=0 ("4,0,5"). Z stays above X and is untouched, exactly as mono-raise-delete prescribes ("delete all candidates now below X"). Effect: burying Y drops its total from 84 to 66, below Z's 72, so the finalists change from {X, Y} to {X, Z}. X still leads the scoring round (now 96), but the runoff is X vs Z, and Z beats X 18-12. X went from winning to losing after being raised — STAR fails the mono-raise-delete criterion (Woodall 1996). It still passes plain mono-raise (see the monotonicity_star_* pair, where the same kind of change leaves X winning). Concept: 01_STAR/01_Learn/properties_and_limits/STAR_monotonicity.md. --- Runoff (Preference) Matrix --- Head-to-head / pairwise comparison Legend: For - Equal Support - Against * indicates Top 2 Finalist | * X | Y | * Z | ------------------------------------------------------------- * X > | --- |21 - 0 - 9 |12 - 0 - 18 | Y > | 9 - 0 - 21 | --- |12 - 0 - 18 | * Z > | 18 - 0 - 12 |18 - 0 - 12 | --- | [Condorcet Winner] Condorcet Winner: Z — matches the STAR winner [Condorcet Loser] Condorcet Loser: Y — loses every head-to-head matchup [Divergence from STAR] STAR = Z Approval = X (differs from STAR) [Runoff Reversal] - Score Round Winner(s) = (X) - Runoff Round Winner = (Z) Candidate X earned the highest total score, but Candidate Z won the automatic runoff — not a malfunction, STAR working as designed: the runoff elects the finalist preferred by the majority (of voters with a preference). --- STAR Voting Method (single winner) --- [STAR Voting] Tabulating 30 ballots. Count × X,Y,Z 12 × 5,4,0 9 × 4,0,5 9 × 0,2,3 [Score Distribution] (how many ballots gave each star rating) Score Candidate 5 4 3 2 1 0 | Total Avg X 12 9 0 0 0 9 | 96 3.2 Y 0 12 0 9 0 9 | 66 2.2 Z 9 0 9 0 0 12 | 72 2.4 [STAR Voting: Scoring Round] The two highest-scoring candidates advance to the next round. X -- 96 -- First place Z -- 72 -- Second place Y -- 66 X and Z advance. [STAR Voting: Automatic Runoff Round] The candidate preferred in the most head-to-head matchups wins. Z -- 18 -- First place X -- 12 Equal Support -- 0 Z wins. Runoff math: 30 ballots cast − 0 Equal Support (no preference between the two finalists) ── 30 voters with a preference (majority = 16) Z 18 (60%) · X 12 (40%) [STAR Voting: Winner — STAR Voting Method (single winner)] Z