"Ordered majority rule" — the countable check (LH-only)¶
The tabulatable evidence behind Ordered majority rule and the "Condorcet isn't desirable" argument. The arXiv paper A Majority Rule Philosophy for Instant Runoff Voting defends RCV-IRV with a new criterion — ordered majority rule — whose plain-English selling point promises to prevent "opposition voters from influencing the choice of candidate from the faction they oppose." Toby Pereira's counterexample (from the votingtheory.org thread) shows the sentence failing on its own terms.
LH-only — an abstract ranked profile, no BetterVoting election (the lesson is the mechanism, not a live tally).
| Election (source) | What it shows |
|---|---|
page · omr_opposition_decides.yaml · tabulated |
35 A>B>C, 33 B>A>C, 32 C>B>A. A leads first choices 35–33, but IRV eliminates C and its transfers hand the A-vs-B race to B (65–35). The opposition (C-first voters, who rank both frontrunners last) decided the intra-frontrunner contest. B is also the Condorcet winner, so IRV isn't misfiring — the point is that the marketing claim is false while the technical criterion escapes only by circular relabeling. |
Concept hubs: Condorcet efficiency · center squeeze · up: method_comparisons — same ballots, different methods