Voting styles — five more ways to fill out one 5-star ballot¶
Generated from 03d_c5_b5_style-gallery-five-more.yaml — do not edit by hand. Regenerate: python STARVote_LH_tabulation_engine/tools_adam/scripts/build_yaml_pages.py.
Method: STAR (single winner) · 1 seat · Expected winner: Clara
Scenario¶
A companion to the eight-style gallery (03c), for the five styles that gallery doesn't show: approval-style (only 0s and 5s), the exaggerated compromise (a fear-driven 5 for the candidate you'd honestly rate mid-field), a partial ballot (score the two you've heard of, leave the rest blank), a compressed middle (everything 2s and 3s), and a null ballot (every candidate the same score). One voter per style. Three of the five say nothing in the runoff. The null ballot says nothing anywhere — delete it and the finalists, the winner and both runoff tallies are identical (Clara 21/Alice 15 becomes Clara 18/Alice 12: every total drops by the same 3, so nothing moves relative to anything else). That is "equal scores indicate no preference" taken to its limit. The exaggerated-compromise voter is the sharp one: Clara was their real favorite and they gave the front-runner Alice a 5 as insurance, so when the final came down to exactly Clara vs Alice they had no preference left to express. Meanwhile the compressed-middle voter, whose widest gap is a single point, cast a full-strength runoff vote — runoff votes count direction, not distance. Lesson: 01_STAR/01_Learn/voting_styles/README.md
Ballots¶
The ballots as marked — the filled bubble is the score given, and the score is the number in its column:
| # | Ballot as marked | Alice | Bruno | Clara | Diego | Erin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | ![]() |
5 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 |
| 2 | ![]() |
5 | 1 | 5 | 2 | 0 |
| 3 | ![]() |
- | - | 5 | 3 | - |
| 4 | ![]() |
2 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 3 |
| 5 | ![]() |
3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
The same ballots as the file records them:
Row 1 = candidate names; each later row is one voter's 0–5 scores (a N × prefix = N identical ballots).
Markers on these ballots: - blank · ~ race abstention · & candidate abstention · ? spoiled · % spoiled+reissued — all tabulate as 0 (reported honestly).
Alice,Bruno,Clara,Diego,Erin
5, 0, 5, 0, 0 # approval-style: a yes/no threshold, only 0s and 5s
5, 1, 5, 2, 0 # exaggerated compromise: Clara is the favorite, Alice a fearful 5
-, -, 5, 3, - # partial ballot: only knows Clara and Diego; blanks count as 0
2, 2, 3, 2, 3 # compressed middle: everything 2s and 3s, nothing extreme
3, 3, 3, 3, 3 # null ballot: same score for everyone — no preference anywhere
What the engine says¶
The count, step by step — the rounds and how the winner is reached:
[Divergence from STAR]
STAR = Clara
Choose-One (Plurality) = Alice (differs from STAR)
RCV-IRV = Alice (differs from STAR)
Note: 4 of 5 ballots (80%) had equal non-zero scores, so their ranks were
decided by candidate priority order. The RCV-IRV result may be an
artifact of score-to-rank tie-breaking rather than a deep
difference.
Note: Ranked Robin (RCV-RR) agrees with STAR, so RCV-IRV is the lone
outlier — the classic center-squeeze signature.
Full round-by-round reports (generated for review):
RCV-IRV rounds: cases_tabulated/03d_c5_b5_style-gallery-five-more_RCV-IRV_tabulated.txt
--- STAR Voting Method (single winner) ---
[STAR Voting]
Tabulating 5 ballots.
Alice,Bruno,Clara,Diego,Erin
5, 0, 5, 0, 0
5, 1, 5, 2, 0
-, -, 5, 3, -
2, 2, 3, 2, 3
3, 3, 3, 3, 3
('-' = left blank / abstained; '0' = scored zero — both count as 0 stars.)
[STAR Voting: Scoring Round]
The two highest-scoring candidates advance to the next round.
Clara -- 21 -- First place
Alice -- 15 -- Second place
Diego -- 10
Bruno -- 6
Erin -- 6
Clara and Alice advance.
[STAR Voting: Automatic Runoff Round]
The candidate preferred in the most head-to-head matchups wins.
Clara -- 2 -- First place
Alice -- 0
Equal Support -- 3
Clara wins.
Runoff math:
5 ballots cast
− 3 Equal Support (no preference between the two finalists)
─
2 voters with a preference (majority = 2)
Clara 2 (100%) · Alice 0 (0%)
[STAR Voting: Winner — STAR Voting Method (single winner)]
Clara
Full audit — preference matrix, Condorcet, and score distribution¶
--- Runoff (Preference) Matrix ---
Head-to-head / pairwise comparison
Legend: For - Equal Support - Against
* indicates Top 2 Finalist
| * Alice | Bruno | * Clara | Diego | Erin |
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Alice > | --- |2 - 3 - 0 |0 - 3 - 2 |2 - 2 - 1 |2 - 2 - 1 |
Bruno > | 0 - 3 - 2 | --- |0 - 1 - 4 |0 - 3 - 2 |1 - 3 - 1 |
* Clara > | 2 - 3 - 0 |4 - 1 - 0 | --- |4 - 1 - 0 |3 - 2 - 0 |
Diego > | 1 - 2 - 2 |2 - 3 - 0 |0 - 1 - 4 | --- |2 - 2 - 1 |
Erin > | 1 - 2 - 2 |1 - 3 - 1 |0 - 2 - 3 |1 - 2 - 2 | --- |
[Condorcet Winner]
Condorcet Winner: Clara — matches the STAR winner
[Condorcet Loser]
No strict Condorcet loser; jointly weak Condorcet losers: Bruno, Erin (winless — pairwise ties)
[Score Distribution] (how many ballots gave each star rating)
Score
Candidate 5 4 3 2 1 0 Abs | Total Avg all Avg rated
Alice 2 0 1 1 0 0 1 | 15 3.0 3.8
Bruno 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 | 6 1.2 1.5
Clara 3 0 2 0 0 0 0 | 21 4.2 4.2
Diego 0 0 2 2 0 1 0 | 10 2.0 2.0
Erin 0 0 2 0 0 2 1 | 6 1.2 1.5
Avg all = Total / all ballots — a blank counts as 0, so this is the Total the Scoring Round ranks on, per ballot.
Avg rated = Total / the ballots that scored this candidate (Abs excluded) — support among voters who had an opinion.
Everything in one file: the _tabulated mirror (regenerated on every run; every analysis forced on).
Run it yourself:
python STARVote_LH_tabulation_engine/starvote_larry_hastings.py 01_STAR/02_Examples/cases/03d_c5_b5_style-gallery-five-more.yaml
See also¶
- Methods disagree on this election — its entry in the divergence review ledger
- Runoff reversal (worked set)
- Ballot & terminology basics
- Glossary · all cases by method
More cases in this set: 02a_c3_b1_three-candidates · 02b_c3_b2_three-candidates · 03a_c3_b3_style-bullet-vote · 03b_c3_b3_1_style-protest-vote · 03b_c3_b3_2_expand_style-protest-vote · 03c_c6_b8_style-gallery · 04b_c4_b3_display-options-all · 05a_c5_b3_unanimous-ballots · 06a_c9_b3_large-field-equal-support · 06b_c9_runoff-overturns-leader · 09_c4_b100_tennessee-capital · abstentions · bv2182_tg4779_faq_runoff_reversal · bv2184_fyy886_lunch_vote · bv2187_qrw6wb_ann-bob-cal · bv2256_c8h3tb_traditional_style · bv2263_xw23m9_over_50_percent · csv_ambiguity_ex1_c4_b8 · display_options_demo · equal_support_runoff_demo · quorum_demo_c3_b6 · quorum_fail_demo_c3_b6 · same_mean_different_spread_c2_b5 · star_ala_approval · three_winners_cw_score_runoff · vote_splitting · vote_splitting2 · vote_splitting3 · vote_splitting_scenario1_spoiler · vote_splitting_scenario2_bloc_leads · vote_splitting_scenario3_outsider_wins




