Does the squeeze survive noise? Two poles, one consensus middle¶
▶ Live on BetterVoting: vote · results ↗ (election td7jfy · test BV2238) — an independent tabulator to check the winners below against.
Bucket — IRV_DIFFERS_ARTIFACT: RCV-IRV differs — tie-break artifact
Generated by STARVote_LH_tabulation_engine/tools_adam/scripts/build_divergence_index.py — rebuilt from the election file; do not hand-edit.
What happens¶
On these ballots RCV-IRV reports Cora rather than STAR's Ben, but this is an artifact of score→rank conversion, not a robust method difference: 2 of 38 ballots have tied non-zero scores, so their ranks are set by an arbitrary candidate-priority order. Ranked Robin and the Condorcet (pairwise) winner both agree with STAR (Ben). Do not use this case to criticize RCV-IRV — the disagreement is a coin-flip created by equal scores and would vanish under a different (equally arbitrary) tie-break.
Winners by method¶
| Method | Winner |
|---|---|
| STAR | Ben |
| RCV-IRV | Cora |
| Ranked Robin (RCV-RR) | Ben |
| Approval | Cora |
| Range / Score | Cora |
| Condorcet | Ben |
Flags: 2 tied-score ballot(s)
Source election: 06_Other/ballot_style_lab/cases/05_c3_b38_squeeze-survives.yaml · STAR tabulated mirror: 05_c3_b38_squeeze-survives_tabulated.txt
3 candidates, 38 ballots.
The ballots¶
Each row is a group of identical score ballots (0 = no support, 5 = max).
| Count | Ava | Ben | Cora |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 3 | 5 | 3 |
| 1 | 0 | 2 | 5 |
| 3 | 5 | 4 | 0 |
| 2 | 0 | 5 | 1 |
| 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 |
| 2 | 5 | 2 | 0 |
| 4 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 10 | 0 | 1 | 5 |
| 1 | 0 | 0 | 5 |
| 1 | 0 | 4 | 5 |
| 1 | 2 | 1 | 0 |
| 1 | 5 | 3 | 0 |
| 1 | 0 | 5 | 5 |
| 3 | 0 | 5 | 2 |
| 1 | 3 | 0 | 5 |
STAR result (official)¶
Scoring round (sum of scores): Cora 124, Ben 111, Ava 80
Finalists (top two): Cora and Ben
Automatic runoff: Cora 18 vs Ben 19 (1 equal/no-preference)
STAR winner: Ben
Full LH STAR engine report:
--- Runoff (Preference) Matrix ---
Head-to-head / pairwise comparison
Legend: For - Equal Support - Against
* indicates Top 2 Finalist
| * Ben | * Cora |
-----------------------------------------------
* Ben > | --- |19 - 1 - 18 |
* Cora > | 18 - 1 - 19 | --- |
[Divergence from STAR]
STAR = Ben
Choose-One (Plurality) = Cora (differs from STAR)
RCV-IRV = Cora (differs from STAR)
Approval = Cora (differs from STAR)
Note: 2 of 38 ballots (5%) had equal non-zero scores, so their ranks were
decided by candidate priority order. The RCV-IRV result may be an
artifact of score-to-rank tie-breaking rather than a deep
difference.
Note: Ranked Robin (RCV-RR) agrees with STAR, so RCV-IRV is the lone
outlier — the classic center-squeeze signature.
[Runoff Reversal]
- Score Round Winner(s) = (Cora)
- Runoff Round Winner = (Ben)
Candidate Cora earned the highest total score, but
Candidate Ben won the automatic runoff — not a malfunction,
STAR working as designed: the runoff elects the finalist preferred
by the majority (of voters with a preference).
--- STAR Voting Method (single winner) ---
Tabulating 38 ballots.
Count × Ava,Ben,Cora
6 × 5, 4, 3
5 × 0, 1, 5
5 × -, 1, 5
4 × 3, 4, 5
3 × 0, 5, 2
2 × 5, 4, -
2 × 5, 2, 0
1 × 3, 5, 3
1 × 0, 2, 5
1 × 0, 5, 1
1 × 0, 0, 5
1 × 0, 4, 5
1 × 2, 1, 0
1 × -, 5, 1
1 × 5, 3, 0
1 × 0, 5, 5
1 × 3, 0, 5
1 × 5, 4, 0
('-' = left blank / abstained; '0' = scored zero — both count as 0 stars.)
[Score Distribution] (how many ballots gave each star rating)
Score
Candidate 5 4 3 2 1 0 Abs | Total Avg all Avg rated
Ava 12 0 6 1 0 13 6 | 80 2.1 2.5
Ben 7 14 1 3 11 2 0 | 111 2.9 2.9
Cora 19 0 7 3 2 5 2 | 124 3.3 3.4
Avg all = Total / all ballots — a blank counts as 0, so this is the Total the Scoring Round ranks on, per ballot.
Avg rated = Total / the ballots that scored this candidate (Abs excluded) — support among voters who had an opinion.
Scoring Round
The two highest-scoring candidates advance to the next round.
Cora -- 124 -- First place
Ben -- 111 -- Second place
Ava -- 80
Cora and Ben advance.
Automatic Runoff Round
The candidate preferred in the most head-to-head matchups wins.
Ben -- 19 -- First place
Cora -- 18
Equal Support -- 1
Ben wins.
Voters with a preference: 37 of 38 (1 Equal Support).
Ben 19 (51%) vs Cora 18 (49%); majority = 19.
Winner — STAR Voting Method (single winner)
Ben
RCV-IRV — round by round¶
--- RCV / Instant-Runoff Voting (single winner) ---
Tabulating 38 ballots (converted from score ballots; 0 = unranked, equal scores broken by candidate priority).
Ballots:
the ranking RCV-IRV reads (0 = unranked, equal scores broken by priority);
the source score ballot follows in () per column: Ava, Ben, Cora
1 × Ben > Ava > Cora (3, 5, 3)
1 × Cora > Ben (0, 2, 5)
3 × Ava > Ben (5, 4, 0)
2 × Ben > Cora (0, 5, 1)
6 × Ava > Ben > Cora (5, 4, 3)
2 × Ava > Ben (5, 2, 0)
4 × Cora > Ben > Ava (3, 4, 5)
10 × Cora > Ben (0, 1, 5)
1 × Cora (0, 0, 5)
1 × Cora > Ben (0, 4, 5)
1 × Ava > Ben (2, 1, 0)
1 × Ava > Ben (5, 3, 0)
1 × Ben > Cora (0, 5, 5)
3 × Ben > Cora (0, 5, 2)
1 × Cora > Ava (3, 0, 5)
ROUND 1
Candidate Votes Status
----------- ------- --------
Cora 18 Hopeful
Ava 13 Hopeful
Ben 7 Rejected
FINAL RESULT
Candidate Votes Status
----------- ------- --------
Cora 24 Elected
Ava 14 Rejected
Ben 0 Rejected
Winner(s) — RCV / Instant-Runoff Voting (single winner)
Cora
--- Smith Set (the generalized Condorcet winner) ---
The smallest group whose every member beats every candidate outside it —
the honest answer to "who is even in contention?".
Smith set (1 of 3): Ben
Outside (2): Ava, Cora
One member ⇒ Ben is the Condorcet winner, beating every rival head-to-head.
RCV-IRV winner Cora is OUTSIDE the Smith set. ✗
Every member of the set (Ben) beats Cora head-to-head, yet
RCV-IRV elected Cora anyway. RCV-IRV is not Smith-efficient (nor
Condorcet-efficient) — this is the shape a center squeeze leaves behind.
More: 07_Concepts/topics/smith_set.md
NOTE: a generated cross-method view of the STAR ballots, for comparison only — not the official STAR result.
Ranked Robin (RCV-RR) — every pair, head-to-head¶
--- Ranked Robin (RCV-RR / Copeland) Method (single winner) ---
Tabulating 38 ballots (score ballots).
Ballots:
the ranking Ranked Robin reads ("=" = tied); source scores follow in () per column: Ava, Ben, Cora
1 × Ben > Ava=Cora (3, 5, 3)
1 × Cora > Ben > Ava (0, 2, 5)
3 × Ava > Ben > Cora (5, 4, 0)
2 × Ben > Cora > Ava (0, 5, 1)
6 × Ava > Ben > Cora (5, 4, 3)
2 × Ava > Ben > Cora (5, 2, 0)
4 × Cora > Ben > Ava (3, 4, 5)
10 × Cora > Ben > Ava (0, 1, 5)
1 × Cora > Ava=Ben (0, 0, 5)
1 × Cora > Ben > Ava (0, 4, 5)
1 × Ava > Ben > Cora (2, 1, 0)
1 × Ava > Ben > Cora (5, 3, 0)
1 × Ben=Cora > Ava (0, 5, 5)
3 × Ben > Cora > Ava (0, 5, 2)
1 × Cora > Ava > Ben (3, 0, 5)
Round-Robin — every pair, head-to-head (For – Against):
Ben beats Ava 23 – 14
Cora beats Ava 24 – 13
Ben beats Cora 19 – 18
--- Pairwise (Round-Robin) Matrix ---
Head-to-head / pairwise comparison — the Ranked Robin tally
Legend: For - Equal Support - Against (row vs column)
| Ava | Ben | Cora |
-----------------------------------------------------
Ava > | --- |14 - 1 - 23 |13 - 1 - 24 |
Ben > | 23 - 1 - 14 | --- |19 - 1 - 18 |
Cora > | 24 - 1 - 13 |18 - 1 - 19 | --- |
Win–loss record — Copeland score = wins + ½·ties (highest score wins; ties broken by total margin, then lot order):
# Candidate W–L–T Copeland Margin Beats
1 Ben 2–0–0 2 +10 Cora, Ava
2 Cora 1–1–0 1 +10 Ava
3 Ava 0–2–0 0 -20 —
Winner — Ranked Robin (RCV-RR): Ben
beats every opponent head-to-head — the Condorcet winner.
--- Smith Set (the generalized Condorcet winner) ---
The smallest group whose every member beats every candidate outside it —
the honest answer to "who is even in contention?".
Smith set (1 of 3): Ben
Outside (2): Ava, Cora
One member ⇒ Ben is the Condorcet winner, beating every rival head-to-head.
Ranked Robin (RCV-RR) winner Ben is INSIDE the Smith set. ✓
Guaranteed: Ranked Robin (Copeland) is Smith-efficient — every member of
the set outscores every outsider, so the top of the win–loss table is
always inside the set, however the tie among them is then broken.
More: 07_Concepts/topics/smith_set.md