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Monotonicity — STAR counterpart (BEFORE — X wins)

Bucket — CYCLE_OR_THREE_WAY: Cycle / three-way split

Generated by STARVote_LH_tabulation_engine/tools_adam/scripts/build_divergence_index.py — rebuilt from the election file; do not hand-edit.

What happens

There is no Condorcet winner — the head-to-head results form a cycle (X beats Y beats Z beats X). With no pairwise anchor the methods split: STAR=X, RCV-IRV=X, Ranked Robin=Y (RR breaks the cycle by total margin). No rule is clearly 'right'; a genuinely hard election, not an indictment of any one method.

Winners by method

Method Winner
STAR X
RCV-IRV X
Ranked Robin (RCV-RR) Y
Approval Y
Range / Score Y
Condorcet none (cycle)

Flags: none

Source election: method_comparisons/monotonicity/cases/monotonicity_star_before.yaml · STAR tabulated mirror: monotonicity_star_before_tabulated.txt

3 candidates, 34 ballots.

The ballots

Each row is a group of identical score ballots (0 = no support, 5 = max).

Count X Y Z
12 5 3 0
12 0 5 3
10 3 0 5

STAR result (official)

Scoring round (sum of scores): Y 96, X 90, Z 86

Finalists (top two): Y and X

Automatic runoff: Y 12 vs X 22

STAR winner: X

Full LH STAR engine report:

--- Runoff (Preference) Matrix ---
Head-to-head / pairwise comparison
Legend: For - Equal Support - Against
        * indicates Top 2 Finalist
                 |     * X      |    * Y      |
-----------------------------------------------
           * X > |     ---      |22 -  0 - 12 |
           * Y > | 12 -  0 - 22 |    ---      |

[Divergence from STAR]
  STAR     = X
  Approval = Y   (differs from STAR)
  RCV-RR   = Y   (differs from STAR)

[Runoff Reversal]
 - Score Round Winner(s) = (Y)
 - Runoff Round Winner   = (X)
  Candidate Y earned the highest total score, but
  Candidate X won the automatic runoff — not a malfunction,
  STAR working as designed: the runoff elects the finalist preferred
  by the majority (of voters with a preference).


--- STAR Voting Method (single winner) ---
 Tabulating 34 ballots.
Count × X,Y,Z
   12 × 5,3,0
   12 × 0,5,3
   10 × 3,0,5

[Score Distribution] (how many ballots gave each star rating)
                   Score
Candidate   5   4   3   2   1   0  | Total   Avg
X          12   0  10   0   0  12  |    90   2.6
Y          12   0  12   0   0  10  |    96   2.8
Z          10   0  12   0   0  12  |    86   2.5

Scoring Round
 The two highest-scoring candidates advance to the next round.
   Y             -- 96 -- First place
   X             -- 90 -- Second place
   Z             -- 86
 Y and X advance.

Automatic Runoff Round
 The candidate preferred in the most head-to-head matchups wins.
   X             -- 22 -- First place
   Y             -- 12
   Equal Support --  0
 X wins.
   Voters with a preference: 34 of 34 (no Equal Support).
   X 22 (65%) vs Y 12 (35%); majority = 18.

Winner — STAR Voting Method (single winner)
 X

RCV-IRV — round by round

--- RCV / Instant-Runoff Voting (single winner) ---
 Tabulating 34 ballots (converted from score ballots; 0 = unranked, equal scores broken by candidate priority).

Ballots:
   the ranking RCV-IRV reads (0 = unranked, equal scores broken by priority);
   the source score ballot follows in () per column: X, Y, Z
    12 ×   X > Y      (5, 3, 0)
    12 ×   Y > Z      (0, 5, 3)
    10 ×   Z > X      (3, 0, 5)

ROUND 1
Candidate      Votes  Status
-----------  -------  --------
Y                 12  Hopeful
X                 12  Hopeful
Z                 10  Rejected

FINAL RESULT
Candidate      Votes  Status
-----------  -------  --------
X                 22  Elected
Y                 12  Rejected
Z                  0  Rejected


Winner(s) — RCV / Instant-Runoff Voting (single winner)
  X

--- Smith Set (the generalized Condorcet winner) ---
The smallest group whose every member beats every candidate outside it —
the honest answer to "who is even in contention?".
   Smith set (3 of 3): X, Y, Z
   Outside (0):        —
   More than one member ⇒ NO Condorcet winner: the top of the tournament is a
   cycle, so the strongest "candidate" is a set, not a person. Which member of
   the set should win is exactly what Minimax / Ranked Pairs / Schulze disagree
   about — see 05_Ranked_Robin/01_Learn/cycle_resolution.md.
   RCV-IRV winner X is INSIDE the Smith set. ✓
      Not guaranteed — RCV-IRV is not Smith-efficient — but it holds here.
   More: 07_Concepts/topics/smith_set.md

NOTE: a generated cross-method view of the STAR ballots, for comparison only — not the official STAR result.

Ranked Robin (RCV-RR) — every pair, head-to-head

--- Ranked Robin (RCV-RR / Copeland) Method (single winner) ---
 Tabulating 34 ballots (score ballots).

Ballots:
   the ranking Ranked Robin reads ("=" = tied); source scores follow in () per column: X, Y, Z
    12 × X > Y > Z      (5, 3, 0)
    12 × Y > Z > X      (0, 5, 3)
    10 × Z > X > Y      (3, 0, 5)

Round-Robin — every pair, head-to-head (For – Against):
   X  beats Y   22 – 12
   Z  beats X   22 – 12
   Y  beats Z   24 – 10

--- Pairwise (Round-Robin) Matrix ---
Head-to-head / pairwise comparison — the Ranked Robin tally
Legend: For - Equal Support - Against   (row vs column)
      |      X       |     Y       |     Z       |
--------------------------------------------------
  X > |     ---      |22 -  0 - 12 |12 -  0 - 22 |
  Y > | 12 -  0 - 22 |    ---      |24 -  0 - 10 |
  Z > | 22 -  0 - 12 |10 -  0 - 24 |    ---      |

Win–loss record — Copeland score = wins + ½·ties (highest score wins; ties broken by total margin, then lot order):
    #  Candidate  W–L–T  Copeland  Margin  Beats
    1  Y          1–1–0         1      +4  Z
    2  X          1–1–0         1      +0  Y
    3  Z          1–1–0         1      -4  X

Winner — Ranked Robin (RCV-RR): Y
   *** 3 candidates tie for the most wins (X, Y, Z) — a Condorcet cycle (no candidate beats all others). Resolved by total margin, then lot order. (This is where Minimax / Ranked Pairs / Schulze differ — see 05_Ranked_Robin/01_Learn/cycle_resolution.md.)

--- Smith Set (the generalized Condorcet winner) ---
The smallest group whose every member beats every candidate outside it —
the honest answer to "who is even in contention?".
   Smith set (3 of 3): X, Y, Z
   Outside (0):        —
   More than one member ⇒ NO Condorcet winner: the top of the tournament is a
   cycle, so the strongest "candidate" is a set, not a person. Which member of
   the set should win is exactly what Minimax / Ranked Pairs / Schulze disagree
   about — see 05_Ranked_Robin/01_Learn/cycle_resolution.md.
   Ranked Robin (RCV-RR) winner Y is INSIDE the Smith set. ✓
      Guaranteed: Ranked Robin (Copeland) is Smith-efficient — every member of
      the set outscores every outsider, so the top of the win–loss table is
      always inside the set, however the tie among them is then broken.
   More: 07_Concepts/topics/smith_set.md