Nine candidates, 25 voters — ranking all nine, counted by RCV-IRV¶
Generated from bv2280_37yf8x_irv_full.yaml — do not edit by hand. Regenerate: python STARVote_LH_tabulation_engine/tools_adam/scripts/build_yaml_pages.py.
Method: rcv-irv · 1 seat · Expected winner: Ben
▶ Live on BetterVoting: vote · results ↗ (election 37yf8x · test BV2280).
Official tie-break (lot) order: Ada > Ben > Cleo > Dev > Emma > Finn > Gus > Hugo > Iris — consulted only if every deterministic tiebreaker stays tied (how the ladder works).
Scenario¶
THE EXPRESSIVE BALLOT DOES NOT RESCUE THE COUNT. These are the same complete, full-resolution rankings as bv2280_37yf8x_rr_full.yaml — every voter's opinion of all nine candidates, nothing rounded and nothing truncated. Instant runoff still elects Ben, not the Condorcet winner Finn.
That is the point this file exists to make, and it is the cleanest comparison in the folder because only ONE thing differs from the Ranked Robin control: the count. Same voters, same paper, same ink — Ranked Robin returns Finn and RCV-IRV returns Ben. So the paper cannot be what decided it.
The mechanism is center squeeze, sharpened by the crowd: Finn stands in the middle of nine candidates on one spectrum, so the first-choice votes that elimination reads are split among the neighbours, and Finn is eliminated before the head-to-heads Finn wins are ever consulted.
It also explains a measured oddity on the topic page: IRV's Condorcet efficiency barely moves when you hand it a coarse ballot instead of a fine one, because it only ever reads each ballot's top surviving choice. Resolution it never looks at costs it nothing — and buys it nothing either.
Construction: build_cases.py in this folder. 25 voters and 9 candidates at frozen positions on one spectrum — Ada −0.73 · Ben −0.37 · Cleo −0.18 · Dev −0.17 · Emma −0.11 · Finn +0.24 · Gus +0.41 · Hugo +0.80 · Iris +0.84; utility = minus the distance; scores = each voter's own min-max scaling onto 0–5; rankings = those same utilities in order. Nothing is tuned to the result, and no count in this folder is settled by a tie-break — that was a search constraint, so every winner here survives any lot rule.
Ballots¶
Each row is one voter's ranking, most-preferred first (N: prefix = N identical ballots).
Ben>Cleo>Dev>Ada>Emma>Finn>Gus>Hugo>Iris # voter at -0.43
Gus>Hugo>Iris>Finn>Emma>Dev>Cleo>Ben>Ada # voter at +0.60
Ada>Ben>Cleo>Dev>Emma>Finn>Gus>Hugo>Iris # voter at -0.67
Iris>Hugo>Gus>Finn>Emma>Dev>Cleo>Ben>Ada # voter at +0.89
Finn>Gus>Emma>Dev>Cleo>Ben>Hugo>Iris>Ada # voter at +0.18
Emma>Dev>Cleo>Ben>Finn>Gus>Ada>Hugo>Iris # voter at -0.13
Gus>Hugo>Iris>Finn>Emma>Dev>Cleo>Ben>Ada # voter at +0.59
Hugo>Iris>Gus>Finn>Emma>Dev>Cleo>Ben>Ada # voter at +0.72
Gus>Finn>Emma>Hugo>Iris>Dev>Cleo>Ben>Ada # voter at +0.34
Hugo>Iris>Gus>Finn>Emma>Dev>Cleo>Ben>Ada # voter at +0.69
Finn>Gus>Emma>Dev>Cleo>Hugo>Iris>Ben>Ada # voter at +0.23
Ben>Cleo>Dev>Emma>Ada>Finn>Gus>Hugo>Iris # voter at -0.30
Ben>Ada>Cleo>Dev>Emma>Finn>Gus>Hugo>Iris # voter at -0.51
Iris>Hugo>Gus>Finn>Emma>Dev>Cleo>Ben>Ada # voter at +0.89
Emma>Dev>Cleo>Finn>Ben>Gus>Ada>Hugo>Iris # voter at -0.05
Gus>Hugo>Iris>Finn>Emma>Dev>Cleo>Ben>Ada # voter at +0.60
Finn>Gus>Emma>Dev>Cleo>Hugo>Iris>Ben>Ada # voter at +0.28
Ben>Cleo>Dev>Emma>Ada>Finn>Gus>Hugo>Iris # voter at -0.40
Hugo>Gus>Iris>Finn>Emma>Dev>Cleo>Ben>Ada # voter at +0.62
Ada>Ben>Cleo>Dev>Emma>Finn>Gus>Hugo>Iris # voter at -0.63
Finn>Gus>Emma>Dev>Cleo>Hugo>Iris>Ben>Ada # voter at +0.27
Ada>Ben>Cleo>Dev>Emma>Finn>Gus>Hugo>Iris # voter at -0.61
Ada>Ben>Cleo>Dev>Emma>Finn>Gus>Hugo>Iris # voter at -1.33
Cleo>Dev>Emma>Ben>Finn>Ada>Gus>Hugo>Iris # voter at -0.23
Ada>Ben>Cleo>Dev>Emma>Finn>Gus>Hugo>Iris # voter at -1.82
What the engine says¶
Where the votes went. Band thickness is votes; a band leaving an eliminated candidate lands on whoever that ballot ranked next, or on inactive if it ranked nobody who was left.
The count, step by step — the rounds and how the winner is reached:
--- RCV / Instant-Runoff Voting (single winner) ---
Nine candidates, 25 voters — ranking all nine, counted by RCV-IRV
Tabulating 25 ballots (ranked ballots).
ROUND 1
Candidate Votes Status
----------- ------- --------
Ada 5 Hopeful
Gus 4 Hopeful
Ben 4 Hopeful
Finn 4 Hopeful
Hugo 3 Hopeful
Iris 2 Hopeful
Emma 2 Hopeful
Cleo 1 Rejected
Dev 0 Rejected
ROUND 2
Candidate Votes Status
----------- ------- --------
Ada 5 Hopeful
Ben 4 Hopeful
Gus 4 Hopeful
Finn 4 Hopeful
Hugo 3 Hopeful
Emma 3 Hopeful
Iris 2 Rejected
Cleo 0 Rejected
Dev 0 Rejected
ROUND 3
Candidate Votes Status
----------- ------- --------
Hugo 5 Hopeful
Ada 5 Hopeful
Gus 4 Hopeful
Ben 4 Hopeful
Finn 4 Hopeful
Emma 3 Rejected
Iris 0 Rejected
Cleo 0 Rejected
Dev 0 Rejected
ROUND 4
Candidate Votes Status
----------- ------- --------
Ben 6 Hopeful
Ada 5 Hopeful
Finn 5 Hopeful
Hugo 5 Hopeful
Gus 4 Rejected
Emma 0 Rejected
Iris 0 Rejected
Cleo 0 Rejected
Dev 0 Rejected
ROUND 5
Candidate Votes Status
----------- ------- --------
Hugo 8 Hopeful
Finn 6 Hopeful
Ben 6 Hopeful
Ada 5 Rejected
Gus 0 Rejected
Emma 0 Rejected
Iris 0 Rejected
Cleo 0 Rejected
Dev 0 Rejected
ROUND 6
Candidate Votes Status
----------- ------- --------
Ben 11 Hopeful
Hugo 8 Hopeful
Finn 6 Rejected
Ada 0 Rejected
Gus 0 Rejected
Emma 0 Rejected
Iris 0 Rejected
Cleo 0 Rejected
Dev 0 Rejected
FINAL RESULT
Candidate Votes Status
----------- ------- --------
Ben 13 Elected
Hugo 12 Rejected
Finn 0 Rejected
Ada 0 Rejected
Gus 0 Rejected
Emma 0 Rejected
Iris 0 Rejected
Cleo 0 Rejected
Dev 0 Rejected
Winner(s) — RCV / Instant-Runoff Voting (single winner)
Ben
Full audit — preference matrix, Condorcet, and score distribution¶
--- Smith Set (the generalized Condorcet winner) ---
The smallest group whose every member beats every candidate outside it —
the honest answer to "who is even in contention?".
Smith set (1 of 9): Finn
Outside (8): Ben, Cleo, Dev, Ada, Emma, Gus, Hugo, Iris
One member ⇒ Finn is the Condorcet winner, beating every rival head-to-head.
RCV-IRV winner Ben is OUTSIDE the Smith set. ✗
Every member of the set (Finn) beats Ben head-to-head, yet
RCV-IRV elected Ben anyway. RCV-IRV is not Smith-efficient (nor
Condorcet-efficient) — this is the shape a center squeeze leaves behind.
More: 07_Concepts/topics/smith_set.md
Everything in one file: the _tabulated mirror (regenerated on every run; every analysis forced on).
Run it yourself:
python STARVote_LH_tabulation_engine/starvote_larry_hastings.py method_comparisons/ballot_expressiveness/cases/bv2280_37yf8x_irv_full.yaml
See also¶
- Center squeeze (topic hub)
- Condorcet efficiency (topic hub)
- Ties & tie-breaking (topic hub)
- The tie-breaking ladder (full chain)
- Vote splitting (worked set)
- Runoff reversal (worked set)
- Glossary · all cases by method
More cases in this set: ballot_expressiveness_c9_irv_top5 · bv2280_37yf8x_rr_full · bv2280_37yf8x_rr_top5 · bv2280_37yf8x_star