Exercise 2 — The tenth ballot: all ten ballots¶
Generated from ex02_tenth_ballot.yaml — do not edit by hand. Regenerate: python STARVote_LH_tabulation_engine/tools_adam/scripts/build_yaml_pages.py.
Method: STAR (single winner) · 1 seat · Expected winner: Chris
Scenario¶
The same nine ballots plus the forgotten tenth — a voter whose favorite is Alex (5), with Chris at 2 and everyone else at 0. The ballot ADDS more to Alex's total than to anyone else's, yet it flips the win away from Alex: scoring round Alex 32, Chris 26, Bella 25, Eli 22, Dana 20 — the extra 2 points lift Chris past Bella into the runoff, and Chris beats Alex head-to-head 6-4. STAR fails the PARTICIPATION criterion: casting an honest ballot can occasionally hurt your favorite (here, by changing WHO Alex has to face). Part of the exercise ex02_tenth_ballot.md. Ballots adapted from a RangeVoting.org example, posed as an exercise in Brendan W. Sullivan, "An Introduction to the Math of Voting Methods" (2022), ch. 5.
Ballots¶
Row 1 = candidate names; each later row is one voter's 0–5 scores (a N × prefix = N identical ballots).
Alex,Bella,Chris,Dana,Eli
3,2,4,5,0 # 4 voters: Dana first, Chris close second
3,2,4,5,0
3,2,4,5,0
3,2,4,5,0
3,5,0,0,4 # 3 voters: Bella first, Eli second
3,5,0,0,4
3,5,0,0,4
3,1,4,0,5 # 2 voters: Eli first, Chris second
3,1,4,0,5
5,0,2,0,0 # the forgotten TENTH ballot: Alex is this voter's favorite
What the engine says¶
The count, step by step — the rounds and how the winner is reached:
[Divergence from STAR]
STAR = Chris
Choose-One (Plurality) = Dana (differs from STAR)
RCV-IRV = Bella (differs from STAR)
Approval = Alex (differs from STAR)
Note: no ballots had tied scores, so RCV-IRV vs STAR here is a genuine
method difference, not a tie-breaking artifact.
Note: Ranked Robin (RCV-RR) agrees with STAR, so RCV-IRV is the lone
outlier — the classic center-squeeze signature.
Full round-by-round reports (generated for review):
RCV-IRV rounds: cases_tabulated/ex02_tenth_ballot_RCV-IRV_tabulated.txt
[Runoff Reversal]
- Score Round Winner(s) = (Alex)
- Runoff Round Winner = (Chris)
Candidate Alex earned the highest total score, but
Candidate Chris won the automatic runoff — not a malfunction,
STAR working as designed: the runoff elects the finalist preferred
by the majority (of voters with a preference).
--- STAR Voting Method (single winner) ---
[STAR Voting]
Tabulating 10 ballots.
Count × Alex,Bella,Chris,Dana,Eli
4 × 3, 2, 4, 5, 0
3 × 3, 5, 0, 0, 4
2 × 3, 1, 4, 0, 5
1 × 5, 0, 2, 0, 0
[STAR Voting: Scoring Round]
The two highest-scoring candidates advance to the next round.
Alex -- 32 -- First place
Chris -- 26 -- Second place
Bella -- 25
Eli -- 22
Dana -- 20
Alex and Chris advance.
[STAR Voting: Automatic Runoff Round]
The candidate preferred in the most head-to-head matchups wins.
Chris -- 6 -- First place
Alex -- 4
Equal Support -- 0
Chris wins.
Runoff math:
10 ballots cast
− 0 Equal Support (no preference between the two finalists)
──
10 voters with a preference (majority = 6)
Chris 6 (60%) · Alex 4 (40%)
[STAR Voting: Winner — STAR Voting Method (single winner)]
Chris
Full audit — preference matrix, Condorcet, and score distribution¶
--- Runoff (Preference) Matrix ---
Head-to-head / pairwise comparison
Legend: For - Equal Support - Against
* indicates Top 2 Finalist
| * Alex | Bella | * Chris | Dana | Eli |
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Alex > | --- |7 - 0 - 3 |4 - 0 - 6 |6 - 0 - 4 |5 - 0 - 5 |
Bella > | 3 - 0 - 7 | --- |3 - 0 - 7 |5 - 1 - 4 |7 - 1 - 2 |
* Chris > | 6 - 0 - 4 |7 - 0 - 3 | --- |3 - 3 - 4 |5 - 0 - 5 |
Dana > | 4 - 0 - 6 |4 - 1 - 5 |4 - 3 - 3 | --- |4 - 1 - 5 |
Eli > | 5 - 0 - 5 |2 - 1 - 7 |5 - 0 - 5 |5 - 1 - 4 | --- |
[Condorcet Winner]
No Condorcet winner (majority cycle: Alex > Bella > Dana > Chris > Alex)
[Score Distribution] (how many ballots gave each star rating)
Score
Candidate 5 4 3 2 1 0 | Total Avg
Alex 1 0 9 0 0 0 | 32 3.2
Bella 3 0 0 4 2 1 | 25 2.5
Chris 0 6 0 1 0 3 | 26 2.6
Dana 4 0 0 0 0 6 | 20 2.0
Eli 2 3 0 0 0 5 | 22 2.2
Everything in one file: the _tabulated mirror (regenerated on every run; every analysis forced on).
Run it yourself:
python STARVote_LH_tabulation_engine/starvote_larry_hastings.py 01_STAR/05_Practice/cases/ex02_tenth_ballot.yaml
See also¶
- Methods disagree on this election — its entry in the divergence review ledger
- Runoff reversal (worked set)
- Glossary · all cases by method
More cases in this set: ex01_district_combined · ex01_district_east · ex01_district_west · ex02_bella_exits · ex02_nine_ballots · ex03_five_verdicts · ex04_olympics_1994 · ex05_center_squeeze · ex06_bullet_backfire · ex06_bullet_honest · ex07_vanishing_votes · ex08_minimal_reversal_2c · ex08_minimal_reversal_3c · ex09_game_night_cycle · ex10_generous · ex10_reticent · ex11_spoiler_added · ex11_two_way_base · ex12_bloc_sweep · ex12_proportional_share · ex13_approve3 · ex13_approve4 · ex13_bullet · ex13_opinions · ex14_two_novels · ex14_two_novels_fullranks · ex15_approval_pairwise · ex15_approval_yes_no · ex15_score_profile