Sincere STAR — the center wins (Beth is the Condorcet winner)¶

Generated from bv2221_2kcwbw_sincere.yaml — do not edit by hand. Regenerate: python STARVote_LH_tabulation_engine/tools_adam/scripts/build_yaml_pages.py.

Method: STAR (single winner) · 1 seat · Expected winner: Beth

▶ Live on BetterVoting: vote · results ↗ (election 2kcwbw · test BV2221).

Scenario¶

A 1-D center-squeeze electorate: Ana (left) and Cole (right) are the poles; Beth is the broadly-liked moderate and the Condorcet winner (she beats Ana 52–48 and Cole 53–47). Beth has a THIN first-choice base (only 5 voters), but on SINCERE ballots the poles' supporters score her a genuine 3, so she leads the scoring round (310) and wins the runoff — STAR elects the Condorcet winner. The strategic-5-1-0 twin (s2) shows what happens when voters min-max instead. Part of the rb-j "does STAR collapse to IRV under 5-1-0?" claim-check.

Ballots¶

Row 1 = candidate names; each later row is one voter's 0–5 scores (a N × prefix = N identical ballots).

Ana, Beth, Cole
48 × 5, 3, 0
47 × 0, 3, 5
 5 × 2, 5, 0

What the engine says¶

The count, step by step — the rounds and how the winner is reached:

[Divergence from STAR]
  STAR                   = Beth
  Choose-One (Plurality) = Ana   (differs from STAR)
  RCV-IRV                = Ana   (differs from STAR)
  Note: no ballots had tied scores, so RCV-IRV vs STAR here is a genuine
        method difference, not a tie-breaking artifact.
  Note: Ranked Robin (RCV-RR) agrees with STAR, so RCV-IRV is the lone
        outlier — the classic center-squeeze signature.
  Full round-by-round reports (generated for review):
  RCV-IRV rounds: cases_tabulated/bv2221_2kcwbw_sincere_RCV-IRV_tabulated.txt

--- STAR Voting Method (single winner) ---

[STAR Voting]
 Tabulating 100 ballots.
Count × Ana,Beth,Cole
   48 ×   5,   3,   0
   47 ×   0,   3,   5
    5 ×   2,   5,   0

[STAR Voting: Scoring Round]
 The two highest-scoring candidates advance to the next round.
   Beth          -- 310 -- First place
   Ana           -- 250 -- Second place
   Cole          -- 235
 Beth and Ana advance.

[STAR Voting: Automatic Runoff Round]
 The candidate preferred in the most head-to-head matchups wins.
   Beth          -- 52 -- First place
   Ana           -- 48
   Equal Support --  0
 Beth wins.
   Runoff math:
     100  ballots cast
   −   0  Equal Support (no preference between the two finalists)
     ───
     100  voters with a preference  (majority = 51)
           Beth 52 (52%)  ·  Ana 48 (48%)

[STAR Voting: Winner — STAR Voting Method (single winner)]
 Beth

Full audit — preference matrix, Condorcet, and score distribution¶

--- Runoff (Preference) Matrix ---
Head-to-head / pairwise comparison
Legend: For - Equal Support - Against
        * indicates Top 2 Finalist
                 |    * Ana     |   * Beth    |     Cole    |
-------------------------------------------------------------
         * Ana > |     ---      |48 -  0 - 52 |53 -  0 - 47 |
        * Beth > | 52 -  0 - 48 |    ---      |53 -  0 - 47 |
          Cole > | 47 -  0 - 53 |47 -  0 - 53 |    ---      |

[Condorcet Winner]
  Condorcet Winner: Beth — matches the STAR winner

[Condorcet Loser]
  Condorcet Loser: Cole — loses every head-to-head matchup

[Score Distribution] (how many ballots gave each star rating)
                   Score
Candidate   5   4   3   2   1   0  | Total   Avg
Ana        48   0   0   5   0  47  |   250   2.5
Beth        5   0  95   0   0   0  |   310   3.1
Cole       47   0   0   0   0  53  |   235   2.4

Everything in one file: the _tabulated mirror (regenerated on every run; every analysis forced on).

Run it yourself:

python STARVote_LH_tabulation_engine/starvote_larry_hastings.py method_comparisons/star_5_1_0_challenge/cases/bv2221_2kcwbw_sincere.yaml

Sincere STAR — the center wins (Beth is the Condorcet winner)¶

Scenario¶

Ballots¶

What the engine says¶

Full audit — preference matrix, Condorcet, and score distribution¶

See also¶