Crowded field, rung 3 — 3 candidates, 65 voters, counted by RCV-IRV¶
Generated from crowded_field_c3_irv.yaml — do not edit by hand. Regenerate: python STARVote_LH_tabulation_engine/tools_adam/scripts/build_yaml_pages.py.
Method: RCV-IRV (Instant Runoff) · 1 seat · Expected winner: Diego
Official tie-break (lot) order: Ana > Diego > Greta — consulted only if every deterministic tiebreaker stays tied (how the ladder works).
Scenario¶
RUNG 1, counted by RCV-IRV on the voters' real rankings. Diego takes 34 first choices of 65 — an outright majority in round 1 — and the count ends there. Nothing for instant runoff to get wrong yet.
Round 1 of this report is also the Choose-One (Plurality) result: Diego, 34 of 65.
Same 65 voters and the same fixed candidate positions as crowded_field_c3_star.yaml, on a ranked ballot — the same ballots as crowded_field_c3_ranked_robin.yaml, counted by elimination instead of head-to-head.
Construction: build_ladder.py in this folder. 65 voters in seven blocs at 0, 4, 8, 12, 16, 20, 24 (sizes 6, 10, 13, 9, 12, 8, 7); candidates fixed at Ana 1 · Bruno 6 · Clara 9 · Diego 11 · Elsa 14 · Felix 16 · Greta 22; utility = minus distance; scores = each bloc's own min-max scaling onto 0–5. Nothing is tuned, and no count at any rung is settled by a tie-break.
Ballots¶
Each row is one voter's ranking, most-preferred first (N: prefix = N identical ballots).
6:Ana>Diego>Greta # bloc at 0
10:Ana>Diego>Greta # bloc at 4
13:Diego>Ana>Greta # bloc at 8
9:Diego>Greta>Ana # bloc at 12
12:Diego>Greta>Ana # bloc at 16
8:Greta>Diego>Ana # bloc at 20
7:Greta>Diego>Ana # bloc at 24
What the engine says¶
The count, step by step — the rounds and how the winner is reached:
--- RCV / Instant-Runoff Voting (single winner) ---
Crowded field, rung 3 — 3 candidates, 65 voters, counted by RCV-IRV
Tabulating 65 ballots (ranked ballots).
FINAL RESULT
Candidate Votes Status
----------- ------- --------
Diego 34 Elected
Ana 16 Rejected
Greta 15 Rejected
Winner(s) — RCV / Instant-Runoff Voting (single winner)
Diego
Full audit — preference matrix, Condorcet, and score distribution¶
--- Smith Set (the generalized Condorcet winner) ---
The smallest group whose every member beats every candidate outside it —
the honest answer to "who is even in contention?".
Smith set (1 of 3): Diego
Outside (2): Ana, Greta
One member ⇒ Diego is the Condorcet winner, beating every rival head-to-head.
RCV-IRV winner Diego is INSIDE the Smith set. ✓
Not guaranteed — RCV-IRV is not Smith-efficient — but it holds here.
More: 07_Concepts/topics/smith_set.md
Everything in one file: the _tabulated mirror (regenerated on every run; every analysis forced on).
Run it yourself:
python STARVote_LH_tabulation_engine/starvote_larry_hastings.py method_comparisons/crowded_field/cases/crowded_field_c3_irv.yaml
See also¶
- Ties & tie-breaking (topic hub)
- The tie-breaking ladder (full chain)
- Runoff reversal (worked set)
- Glossary · all cases by method
More cases in this set: crowded_field_c3_approval · crowded_field_c3_ranked_robin · crowded_field_c3_star · crowded_field_c5_approval · crowded_field_c5_irv · crowded_field_c5_ranked_robin · crowded_field_c5_star · crowded_field_c7_approval · crowded_field_c7_irv · crowded_field_c7_ranked_robin · crowded_field_c7_star