Brams' grading paradox — the grade leader loses the runoff¶
Generated from brams_grading_paradox_c3_b3.yaml — do not edit by hand. Regenerate: python STARVote_LH_tabulation_engine/tools_adam/scripts/build_yaml_pages.py.
Method: STAR (single winner) · 1 seat · Expected winner: Baker
Scenario¶
Steven Brams' three-voter grading example (Brams & Potthoff, "The paradox of grading systems," Public Choice 165, 2015), offered as a critique of grading systems: the candidate with the best grade total (Adams, 6-5-4) is not the head-to-head champion (Baker beats both rivals — the Condorcet winner). Run under STAR, the example vindicates the automatic runoff instead of indicting it: finalists Adams & Baker, and Baker takes the seat 2-1. Pure score summation (Score voting) elects Adams. The Approval reading depends entirely on where the 0/1 line is drawn: the engine's any-non-zero cut elects Adams, Brams' own top-grades cut elects Baker, and two other reasonable cuts produce ties. Grades {0..3} as in the original slide. LH-only for now (no BetterVoting election).
Ballots¶
Row 1 = candidate names; each later row is one voter's 0–5 scores (a N × prefix = N identical ballots).
Adams,Baker,Chen
3,0,0 # voter 1 — Adams gets the top grade, zeros for the rest
2,3,3 # voter 2 — Baker and Chen top grades, Adams a friendly 2
1,2,1 # voter 3 — Baker best, mild on Adams and Chen
What the engine says¶
The count, step by step — the rounds and how the winner is reached:
[Divergence from STAR]
STAR = Baker
Approval = Adams (differs from STAR)
[Runoff Reversal]
- Score Round Winner(s) = (Adams)
- Runoff Round Winner = (Baker)
Candidate Adams earned the highest total score, but
Candidate Baker won the automatic runoff — not a malfunction,
STAR working as designed: the runoff elects the finalist preferred
by the majority (of voters with a preference).
--- STAR Voting Method (single winner) ---
[STAR Voting]
Tabulating 3 ballots.
Adams,Baker,Chen
3, 0, 0
2, 3, 3
1, 2, 1
[STAR Voting: Scoring Round]
The two highest-scoring candidates advance to the next round.
Adams -- 6 -- First place
Baker -- 5 -- Second place
Chen -- 4
Adams and Baker advance.
[STAR Voting: Automatic Runoff Round]
The candidate preferred in the most head-to-head matchups wins.
Baker -- 2 -- First place
Adams -- 1
Equal Support -- 0
Baker wins.
Runoff math:
3 ballots cast
− 0 Equal Support (no preference between the two finalists)
─
3 voters with a preference (majority = 2)
Baker 2 (67%) · Adams 1 (33%)
[STAR Voting: Winner — STAR Voting Method (single winner)]
Baker
Full audit — preference matrix, Condorcet, and score distribution¶
--- Runoff (Preference) Matrix ---
Head-to-head / pairwise comparison
Legend: For - Equal Support - Against
* indicates Top 2 Finalist
| * Adams | * Baker | Chen |
-----------------------------------------------------
* Adams > | --- |1 - 0 - 2 |1 - 1 - 1 |
* Baker > | 2 - 0 - 1 | --- |1 - 2 - 0 |
Chen > | 1 - 1 - 1 |0 - 2 - 1 | --- |
[Condorcet Winner]
Condorcet Winner: Baker — matches the STAR winner
[Condorcet Loser]
No strict Condorcet loser; jointly weak Condorcet losers: Adams, Chen (winless — pairwise ties) — Adams elected by Approval!
[Score Distribution] (how many ballots gave each star rating)
Score
Candidate 5 4 3 2 1 0 | Total Avg
Adams 0 0 1 1 1 0 | 6 2.0
Baker 0 0 1 1 0 1 | 5 1.7
Chen 0 0 1 0 1 1 | 4 1.3
Everything in one file: the _tabulated mirror (regenerated on every run; every analysis forced on).
Run it yourself:
python STARVote_LH_tabulation_engine/starvote_larry_hastings.py method_comparisons/brams_grading_paradox/cases/brams_grading_paradox_c3_b3.yaml
See also¶
- Methods disagree on this election — its entry in the divergence review ledger
- Condorcet efficiency (topic hub)
- Ties & tie-breaking (topic hub)
- Runoff reversal (worked set)
- Glossary · all cases by method
More cases in this set: brams_ex3_two_candidates_c2_b5 · brams_ex6_three_winners_c3_b9