Summability demo — STAR combined A+B (Oak; precinct subtotals add up)¶

Generated from star_combined.yaml — do not edit by hand. Regenerate: python STARVote_LH_tabulation_engine/tools_adam/scripts/build_yaml_pages.py.

Method: STAR (single winner) · 1 seat · Expected winner: Oak

Official tie-break (lot) order: Maple > Oak > Pine — consulted only if every deterministic tiebreaker stays tied (how the ladder works).

Scenario¶

Districts A + B merged (all six ballots): Oak wins the combined STAR count. Check it against the two district files — every score total and every pairwise-matrix cell here is exactly the SUM of the districts' published subtotals. No central ballot pile, no recount: precincts report, totals add. That is summability; the irv_* trio shows RCV-IRV failing exactly this test.

Ballots¶

Row 1 = candidate names; each later row is one voter's 0–5 scores (a N × prefix = N identical ballots).

Maple, Oak, Pine
5,4,0
5,3,1
0,2,5
1,5,4
0,5,3
4,0,5

What the engine says¶

The count, step by step — the rounds and how the winner is reached:

[Divergence from STAR]
  STAR                   = Oak
  Choose-One (Plurality) = Maple   (differs from STAR)

--- STAR Voting Method (single winner) ---

[STAR Voting]
 Tabulating 6 ballots.
Maple,Oak,Pine
    5,  4,   0
    5,  3,   1
    0,  2,   5
    1,  5,   4
    0,  5,   3
    4,  0,   5

[STAR Voting: Scoring Round]
 The two highest-scoring candidates advance to the next round.
   Oak           -- 19 -- First place
   Pine          -- 18 -- Second place
   Maple         -- 15
 Oak and Pine advance.

[STAR Voting: Automatic Runoff Round]
 The candidate preferred in the most head-to-head matchups wins.
   Oak           -- 4 -- First place
   Pine          -- 2
   Equal Support -- 0
 Oak wins.
   Runoff math:
     6  ballots cast
   − 0  Equal Support (no preference between the two finalists)
     ─
     6  voters with a preference  (majority = 4)
           Oak 4 (67%)  ·  Pine 2 (33%)

[STAR Voting: Winner — STAR Voting Method (single winner)]
 Oak

Full audit — preference matrix, Condorcet, and score distribution¶

--- Runoff (Preference) Matrix ---
Head-to-head / pairwise comparison
Legend: For - Equal Support - Against
        * indicates Top 2 Finalist
               |    Maple   |  * Oak    |  * Pine   |
-----------------------------------------------------
       Maple > |    ---     |3 - 0 - 3  |2 - 0 - 4  |
       * Oak > | 3 - 0 - 3  |   ---     |4 - 0 - 2  |
      * Pine > | 4 - 0 - 2  |2 - 0 - 4  |   ---     |

[Condorcet Winner]
  No strict Condorcet winner; weak Condorcet winner: Oak — matches the STAR winner

[Condorcet Loser]
  No strict Condorcet loser; weak Condorcet loser: Maple (never wins a matchup) — elected by Choose-One (Plurality)!

[Score Distribution] (how many ballots gave each star rating)
                Score
Candidate  5  4  3  2  1  0  | Total   Avg
Maple      2  1  0  0  1  2  |    15   2.5
Oak        2  1  1  1  0  1  |    19   3.2
Pine       2  1  1  0  1  1  |    18   3.0

Everything in one file: the _tabulated mirror (regenerated on every run; every analysis forced on).

Run it yourself:

python STARVote_LH_tabulation_engine/starvote_larry_hastings.py method_comparisons/summability_demo/cases/star_combined.yaml

Summability demo — STAR combined A+B (Oak; precinct subtotals add up)¶

Scenario¶

Ballots¶

What the engine says¶

Full audit — preference matrix, Condorcet, and score distribution¶

See also¶