P3 manipulated — Zwicker's complete reversal makes Dublin a 4-0 Condorcet winner¶
Generated from p3_manip_reversal_rr.yaml — do not edit by hand. Regenerate: python STARVote_LH_tabulation_engine/tools_adam/scripts/build_yaml_pages.py.
Method: Ranked Robin (RCV-RR / Copeland) · 1 seat · Expected winner: Dublin
Official tie-break (lot) order: Athens > Bergen > Cork > Dublin > Edinburgh — consulted only if every deterministic tiebreaker stays tied (how the ladder works).
Scenario¶
The book's own printed manipulation. One of the two sincere Athens>Bergen>Cork>Dublin>Edinburgh voters completely REVERSES their ballot to Edinburgh>Dublin>Cork>Bergen>Athens. That single reversed ballot flips two knife-edge 4-3 contests (Athens vs Dublin and Cork vs Dublin), and Dublin goes from 2-2 to 4-0: a symmetric Copeland score of +4, the maximum possible for five candidates, and now an outright Condorcet winner. The manipulator has replaced their LAST choice (Edinburgh) with their 4th (Dublin) — a strict gain — by submitting a ballot that misrepresents every single pairwise preference they hold. IMPORTANT for this repo: Ranked Robin IS Copeland plus a tiebreak, so the book's showcase manipulation is a manipulation of a method this library advocates.
Ballots¶
Each row is one voter's ranking, most-preferred first (N: prefix = N identical ballots).
2:Edinburgh>Cork>Athens>Dublin>Bergen
3:Dublin>Edinburgh>Bergen>Cork>Athens
1:Athens>Bergen>Cork>Dublin>Edinburgh
1:Edinburgh>Dublin>Cork>Bergen>Athens
What the engine says¶
The count, step by step — the rounds and how the winner is reached:
--- Ranked Robin (RCV-RR / Copeland) Method (single winner) ---
Tabulating 7 ballots (ranked ballots).
Ballots:
2 × Edinburgh > Cork > Athens > Dublin > Bergen
3 × Dublin > Edinburgh > Bergen > Cork > Athens
1 × Athens > Bergen > Cork > Dublin > Edinburgh
1 × Edinburgh > Dublin > Cork > Bergen > Athens
Round-Robin — every pair, head-to-head (For – Against):
Edinburgh beats Cork 6 – 1
Edinburgh beats Athens 6 – 1
Dublin beats Edinburgh 4 – 3
Edinburgh beats Bergen 6 – 1
Cork beats Athens 6 – 1
Dublin beats Cork 4 – 3
Bergen beats Cork 4 – 3
Dublin beats Athens 4 – 3
Bergen beats Athens 4 – 3
Dublin beats Bergen 6 – 1
--- Pairwise (Round-Robin) Matrix ---
Head-to-head / pairwise comparison — the Ranked Robin tally
Legend: For - Equal Support - Against (row vs column)
| Edinburgh | Cork | Athens | Dublin | Bergen |
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Edinburgh > | --- | 6 - 0 - 1 | 6 - 0 - 1 | 3 - 0 - 4 | 6 - 0 - 1 |
Cork > | 1 - 0 - 6 | --- | 6 - 0 - 1 | 3 - 0 - 4 | 3 - 0 - 4 |
Athens > | 1 - 0 - 6 | 1 - 0 - 6 | --- | 3 - 0 - 4 | 3 - 0 - 4 |
Dublin > | 4 - 0 - 3 | 4 - 0 - 3 | 4 - 0 - 3 | --- | 6 - 0 - 1 |
Bergen > | 1 - 0 - 6 | 4 - 0 - 3 | 4 - 0 - 3 | 1 - 0 - 6 | --- |
Win–loss record — Copeland score = wins + ½·ties (highest score wins; ties broken by total margin, then lot order):
# Candidate W–L–T Copeland Margin Beats
1 Dublin 4–0–0 4 +8 Edinburgh, Bergen, Cork, Athens
2 Edinburgh 3–1–0 3 +14 Bergen, Cork, Athens
3 Bergen 2–2–0 2 -8 Cork, Athens
4 Cork 1–3–0 1 -2 Athens
5 Athens 0–4–0 0 -12 —
Winner — Ranked Robin (RCV-RR): Dublin
beats every opponent head-to-head — the Condorcet winner.
Full audit — preference matrix, Condorcet, and score distribution¶
--- Smith Set (the generalized Condorcet winner) ---
The smallest group whose every member beats every candidate outside it —
the honest answer to "who is even in contention?".
Smith set (1 of 5): Dublin
Outside (4): Edinburgh, Cork, Athens, Bergen
One member ⇒ Dublin is the Condorcet winner, beating every rival head-to-head.
Ranked Robin (RCV-RR) winner Dublin is INSIDE the Smith set. ✓
Guaranteed: Ranked Robin (Copeland) is Smith-efficient — every member of
the set outscores every outsider, so the top of the win–loss table is
always inside the set, however the tie among them is then broken.
More: 07_Concepts/topics/smith_set.md
Everything in one file: the _tabulated mirror (regenerated on every run; every analysis forced on).
Run it yourself:
python STARVote_LH_tabulation_engine/starvote_larry_hastings.py method_comparisons/manipulability_p3/cases/p3_manip_reversal_rr.yaml
See also¶
- Condorcet efficiency (topic hub)
- Ties & tie-breaking (topic hub)
- The tie-breaking ladder (full chain)
- Glossary · all cases by method
More cases in this set: p3_manip_compromise_rr · p3_manip_star · p3_sincere_ranked_robin · p3_sincere_star