Alaska 2022 (Begich buried) — a manufactured cycle; margin methods resist, TTR/Hare doesn't¶

Generated from alaska_buried_c3_b200.yaml — do not edit by hand. Regenerate: python STARVote_LH_tabulation_engine/tools_adam/scripts/build_yaml_pages.py.

Method: RCV-IRV (Instant Runoff) · 1 seat · Expected winner: Peltola

Scenario¶

The same electorate, but 20 of the 50 Peltola>Begich>Palin voters BURY Begich — insincerely ranking him last (Peltola>Palin>Begich). That single move flips the Begich-vs-Palin pairwise from Begich +39 to Palin +1, creating a Condorcet cycle (Begich>Peltola>Palin>Begich, no Condorcet winner). Now the completion methods DIVERGE: MinMax / Schulze / Ranked Pairs (margin-based) drop Palin's weak +1 defeat and still elect Begich — the burial FAILS. But Condorcet-Hare / Condorcet- Top-Two-Runoff (= RCV-IRV in a 3-way cycle) elects Peltola — the burial SUCCEEDS. rb-j's point: even Condorcet methods can be gamed by burial, and margin-based completion resists it far better than a runoff/Hare completion.

Ballots¶

Each row is one voter's ranking, most-preferred first (N: prefix = N identical ballots).

30:Peltola>Begich>Palin
36:Palin>Begich>Peltola
29:Begich>Palin>Peltola
25:Peltola
23:Palin
16:Begich>Peltola>Palin
12:Begich
25:Peltola>Palin>Begich
4:Palin>Peltola>Begich

What the engine says¶

Round-by-round Sankey diagram: each candidate's votes as a band, and where the votes of an eliminated candidate transferred to.

Where the votes went. Band thickness is votes; a band leaving an eliminated candidate lands on whoever that ballot ranked next, or on inactive if it ranked nobody who was left.

The count, step by step — the rounds and how the winner is reached:

--- RCV / Instant-Runoff Voting (single winner) ---
  Alaska 2022 (Begich buried) — a manufactured cycle; margin methods resist, TTR/Hare doesn't
 Tabulating 200 ballots (ranked ballots).

ROUND 1
Candidate      Votes  Status
-----------  -------  --------
Peltola           80  Hopeful
Palin             63  Hopeful
Begich            57  Rejected

FINAL RESULT
Candidate      Votes  Status
-----------  -------  --------
Peltola           96  Elected
Palin             92  Rejected
Begich             0  Rejected
Blank Votes       12  Rejected


Winner(s) — RCV / Instant-Runoff Voting (single winner)
  Peltola

Full audit — preference matrix, Condorcet, and score distribution¶

--- Smith Set (the generalized Condorcet winner) ---
The smallest group whose every member beats every candidate outside it —
the honest answer to "who is even in contention?".
   Smith set (3 of 3): Peltola, Begich, Palin
   Outside (0):        —
   More than one member ⇒ NO Condorcet winner: the top of the tournament is a
   cycle, so the strongest "candidate" is a set, not a person. Which member of
   the set should win is exactly what Minimax / Ranked Pairs / Schulze disagree
   about — see 05_Ranked_Robin/01_Learn/cycle_resolution.md.
   RCV-IRV winner Peltola is INSIDE the Smith set. ✓
      Not guaranteed — RCV-IRV is not Smith-efficient — but it holds here.
   More: 07_Concepts/topics/smith_set.md

Everything in one file: the _tabulated mirror (regenerated on every run; every analysis forced on).

Run it yourself:

python STARVote_LH_tabulation_engine/starvote_larry_hastings.py method_comparisons/condorcet_burial_alaska/cases/alaska_buried_c3_b200.yaml

Alaska 2022 (Begich buried) — a manufactured cycle; margin methods resist, TTR/Hare doesn't¶

Scenario¶

Ballots¶

What the engine says¶

Full audit — preference matrix, Condorcet, and score distribution¶

See also¶