The same ballots under STV — 2 seats, and the minority gets one¶
Generated from bpv_bakery_stv_c4_b12.yaml — do not edit by hand. Regenerate: python STARVote_LH_tabulation_engine/tools_adam/scripts/build_yaml_pages.py.
Method: STV (proportional, ranked ballots) · 2 seats · Expected winners: Almond, Croissant
Scenario¶
The control for the block-preferential pair: identical ballots, identical two seats, counted PROPORTIONALLY instead. STV's Droop quota here is 12 / (2 + 1) = 4 (the engine's exact form; the hand-count rule floor(12/3) + 1 = 5 is the other standard reading, and both land in the same place on these ballots). Almond has 5 and Croissant has 5 — both clear quota in the first round, both are seated, and the board splits 1-1 between the 7-voter majority and the 5-voter minority. Block preferential voting on these same ballots elects Almond AND Brioche — a clean sweep for the majority (bpv_bakery_seat1_c4_b12.yaml + bpv_bakery_seat2_c3_b12.yaml). Same ranked ballot, same voters, opposite philosophy: the ballot decides what voters can say, the COUNT decides how the seats are shared. Lesson: 06_Other/RCV_IRV/concepts/variants/RCV-IRV-block-preferential.md
Ballots¶
Each row is one voter's ranking, most-preferred first (N: prefix = N identical ballots).
5:Almond>Brioche>Croissant>Danish
2:Brioche>Almond>Croissant>Danish
5:Croissant>Danish>Almond>Brioche
What the engine says¶
The count, step by step — the rounds and how the winner is reached:
--- STV / Single Transferable Vote (multi-winner — 2 seats) ---
The same ballots under STV — 2 seats, and the minority gets one
Tabulating 12 ballots (ranked ballots).
2 seats; quota = 4.00 (exact Droop, votes/(seats+1)) — 33.3% of 12.
Elected at >= quota, and every surplus is measured from it.
(Hand-count Droop, floor(12/3)+1 = 5, is a different but equally standard rule.)
FINAL RESULT
Candidate Votes Status
----------- ------- --------
Almond 5 Elected
Croissant 5 Elected
Brioche 2 Rejected
Danish 0 Rejected
Winner(s) — STV / Single Transferable Vote (multi-winner — 2 seats)
Almond
Croissant
Full audit — preference matrix, Condorcet, and score distribution¶
--- Smith Set (the generalized Condorcet winner) ---
The smallest group whose every member beats every candidate outside it —
the honest answer to "who is even in contention?".
Smith set (1 of 4): Almond
Outside (3): Brioche, Croissant, Danish
One member ⇒ Almond is the Condorcet winner, beating every rival head-to-head.
More: 07_Concepts/topics/smith_set.md
Everything in one file: the _tabulated mirror (regenerated on every run; every analysis forced on).
Run it yourself:
python STARVote_LH_tabulation_engine/starvote_larry_hastings.py method_comparisons/block_preferential/cases/bpv_bakery_stv_c4_b12.yaml
See also¶
More cases in this set: bpv_bakery_block_plurality_c4_b12 · bpv_bakery_seat1_c4_b12 · bpv_bakery_seat2_c3_b12