election_title: "Reversal symmetry — RCV-IRV, original: A wins (best)"
scenario_description: |-
  A reversal-symmetry demonstration (from rangevoting.org / Warren Smith — a Range-advocacy
  source, so advocacy-leaning; disclosed). 24 voters, three candidates, a Condorcet CYCLE
  (A>B>C>A — no candidate beats all others). Counted by RCV-IRV, A wins: C has the fewest
  first-choices, is eliminated, and C's ballots flow to A (15-9). The companion
  reversal_irv_reversed reverses EVERY ballot — as if voters were choosing the WORST
  candidate — and A wins AGAIN. That winner=loser outcome is a failure of the reversal
  symmetry criterion, which RCV-IRV and plurality fail but additive methods (Range, Borda,
  Approval) and some Condorcet methods (Ranked Pairs, Schulze) satisfy. See ../README.md;
  STAR and Ranked Robin do NOT reproduce the winner=loser on this example.
paradoxes: [condorcet-cycle]
voting_method: RCV_IRV
num_winners: 1
ballots: |-
  9:B>C>A
  8:A>B>C
  7:C>A>B
expected_winners:
  - A
# file: reversal_irv_original.yaml