======================================================================
SOURCE FILE:     reversal_star_reversed.yaml
TABULATED FILE:  reversal_star_reversed_tabulated.txt
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election_title: "Reversal symmetry — STAR, reversed: A (differs from original B — no winner=loser)"
scenario_description: |-
  The STAR original (reversal_star_original) with every preference reversed (scores re-mapped
  5/3/0 to the reversed ranking). STAR elects A — different from the original winner B — so unlike
  RCV-IRV (which elects A both ways), STAR's "best" and "worst" here are not the same candidate.
  Scope note per ../README.md: this demonstrates STAR avoiding the winner=loser on this example,
  not a general reversal-symmetry proof. Condorcet cycle electorate.
paradoxes: [condorcet-cycle]
voting_method: STAR
num_winners: 1
ballots: |-
  Count:A,B,C
  9:5,0,3
  8:0,3,5
  7:3,5,0
expected_winners:
  - A

# file: reversal_star_reversed.yaml

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TABULATION RESULTS
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=== Reversal symmetry — STAR, reversed: A (differs from original B — no winner=loser) ===
  The STAR original (reversal_star_original) with every preference reversed (scores re-mapped
  5/3/0 to the reversed ranking). STAR elects A — different from the original winner B — so unlike
  RCV-IRV (which elects A both ways), STAR's "best" and "worst" here are not the same candidate.
  Scope note per ../README.md: this demonstrates STAR avoiding the winner=loser on this example,
  not a general reversal-symmetry proof. Condorcet cycle electorate.

--- Runoff (Preference) Matrix ---
Head-to-head / pairwise comparison
Legend: For - Equal Support - Against
        * indicates Top 2 Finalist
                 |     * A      |      B      |    * C      |
-------------------------------------------------------------
           * A > |     ---      | 9 -  0 - 15 |16 -  0 -  8 |
             B > | 15 -  0 -  9 |    ---      | 7 -  0 - 17 |
           * C > |  8 -  0 - 16 |17 -  0 -  7 |    ---      |

[Condorcet Winner]
  No Condorcet winner (majority cycle: A > C > B > A)

[Divergence from STAR]
  STAR     = A
  Approval = C   (differs from STAR)

[Runoff Reversal]
 - Score Round Winner(s) = (C)
 - Runoff Round Winner   = (A)
  Candidate C earned the highest total score, but
  Candidate A won the automatic runoff — not a malfunction,
  STAR working as designed: the runoff elects the finalist preferred
  by the majority (of voters with a preference).


--- STAR Voting Method (single winner) ---
[STAR Voting]
 Tabulating 24 ballots.
Count × A,B,C
    9 × 5,0,3
    8 × 0,3,5
    7 × 3,5,0

[Score Distribution] (how many ballots gave each star rating)
                Score
Candidate  5  4  3  2  1  0  | Total   Avg
A          9  0  7  0  0  8  |    66   2.8
B          7  0  8  0  0  9  |    59   2.5
C          8  0  9  0  0  7  |    67   2.8

[STAR Voting: Scoring Round]
 The two highest-scoring candidates advance to the next round.
   C             -- 67 -- First place
   A             -- 66 -- Second place
   B             -- 59
 C and A advance.

[STAR Voting: Automatic Runoff Round]
 The candidate preferred in the most head-to-head matchups wins.
   A             -- 16 -- First place
   C             --  8
   Equal Support --  0
 A wins.
   Runoff math:
     24  ballots cast
   −  0  Equal Support (no preference between the two finalists)
     ──
     24  voters with a preference  (majority = 13)
           A 16 (67%)  ·  C 8 (33%)

[STAR Voting: Winner — STAR Voting Method (single winner)]
 A