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SOURCE FILE:     reversal_irv_reversed.yaml
TABULATED FILE:  reversal_irv_reversed_tabulated.txt
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election_title: "Reversal symmetry — RCV-IRV, reversed: A wins AGAIN (worst = best)"
scenario_description: |-
  The original election (reversal_irv_original) with EVERY voter's ballot reversed — each now
  expresses the exact opposite preference, as if trying to elect the WORST candidate. You would
  expect A (the original winner) to now finish last. Instead RCV-IRV elects A AGAIN (16-8): B has
  the fewest first-choices, is eliminated, and B's ballots flow to A. So IRV's "best" candidate and
  its "worst" candidate are the same — a reversal symmetry FAILURE. This is a real, IRV-specific
  defect (concede it). Caveats on ../README.md: the electorate is a Condorcet cycle, so there is no
  "correct" winner; STAR gives B then A (no winner=loser); source is Range-advocacy (lean disclosed).
paradoxes: [condorcet-cycle]
voting_method: RCV_IRV
num_winners: 1
ballots: |-
  9:A>C>B
  8:C>B>A
  7:B>A>C
expected_winners:
  - A
# file: reversal_irv_reversed.yaml

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TABULATION RESULTS
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--- RCV / Instant-Runoff Voting (single winner) ---
  Reversal symmetry — RCV-IRV, reversed: A wins AGAIN (worst = best)
 Tabulating 24 ballots (ranked ballots).

ROUND 1
Candidate      Votes  Status
-----------  -------  --------
A                  9  Hopeful
C                  8  Hopeful
B                  7  Rejected

FINAL RESULT
Candidate      Votes  Status
-----------  -------  --------
A                 16  Elected
C                  8  Rejected
B                  0  Rejected


Winner(s) — RCV / Instant-Runoff Voting (single winner)
  A

--- Smith Set (the generalized Condorcet winner) ---
The smallest group whose every member beats every candidate outside it —
the honest answer to "who is even in contention?".
   Smith set (3 of 3): A, C, B
   Outside (0):        —
   More than one member ⇒ NO Condorcet winner: the top of the tournament is a
   cycle, so the strongest "candidate" is a set, not a person. Which member of
   the set should win is exactly what Minimax / Ranked Pairs / Schulze disagree
   about — see 05_Ranked_Robin/01_Learn/cycle_resolution.md.
   RCV-IRV winner A is INSIDE the Smith set. ✓
      Not guaranteed — RCV-IRV is not Smith-efficient — but it holds here.
   More: 07_Concepts/topics/smith_set.md