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SOURCE FILE:     reversal_irv_original.yaml
TABULATED FILE:  reversal_irv_original_tabulated.txt
======================================================================

election_title: "Reversal symmetry — RCV-IRV, original: A wins (best)"
scenario_description: |-
  A reversal-symmetry demonstration (from rangevoting.org / Warren Smith — a Range-advocacy
  source, so advocacy-leaning; disclosed). 24 voters, three candidates, a Condorcet CYCLE
  (A>B>C>A — no candidate beats all others). Counted by RCV-IRV, A wins: C has the fewest
  first-choices, is eliminated, and C's ballots flow to A (15-9). The companion
  reversal_irv_reversed reverses EVERY ballot — as if voters were choosing the WORST
  candidate — and A wins AGAIN. That winner=loser outcome is a failure of the reversal
  symmetry criterion, which RCV-IRV and plurality fail but additive methods (Range, Borda,
  Approval) and some Condorcet methods (Ranked Pairs, Schulze) satisfy. See ../README.md;
  STAR and Ranked Robin do NOT reproduce the winner=loser on this example.
paradoxes: [condorcet-cycle]
voting_method: RCV_IRV
num_winners: 1
ballots: |-
  9:B>C>A
  8:A>B>C
  7:C>A>B
expected_winners:
  - A
# file: reversal_irv_original.yaml

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TABULATION RESULTS
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--- RCV / Instant-Runoff Voting (single winner) ---
  Reversal symmetry — RCV-IRV, original: A wins (best)
 Tabulating 24 ballots (ranked ballots).

ROUND 1
Candidate      Votes  Status
-----------  -------  --------
B                  9  Hopeful
A                  8  Hopeful
C                  7  Rejected

FINAL RESULT
Candidate      Votes  Status
-----------  -------  --------
A                 15  Elected
B                  9  Rejected
C                  0  Rejected


Winner(s) — RCV / Instant-Runoff Voting (single winner)
  A

--- Smith Set (the generalized Condorcet winner) ---
The smallest group whose every member beats every candidate outside it —
the honest answer to "who is even in contention?".
   Smith set (3 of 3): B, C, A
   Outside (0):        —
   More than one member ⇒ NO Condorcet winner: the top of the tournament is a
   cycle, so the strongest "candidate" is a set, not a person. Which member of
   the set should win is exactly what Minimax / Ranked Pairs / Schulze disagree
   about — see 05_Ranked_Robin/01_Learn/cycle_resolution.md.
   RCV-IRV winner A is INSIDE the Smith set. ✓
      Not guaranteed — RCV-IRV is not Smith-efficient — but it holds here.
   More: 07_Concepts/topics/smith_set.md