====================================================================== SOURCE FILE: bv2281_qycpbx_ossipoff_irv.yaml TABULATED FILE: bv2281_qycpbx_ossipoff_irv_tabulated.txt ====================================================================== election_title: "Ossipoff's 303 — the first-round LEADER is eliminated" scenario_description: |- A constructed 5-candidate, 303-voter profile published on rangevoting.org (Warren D. Smith's site, section 12, credited to Mike Ossipoff). Reproduced here exactly as given, because it is a sharper example than the one it is usually filed under. The textbook center squeeze eliminates a Condorcet winner who holds FEW first choices — that is the whole mechanism, and it lets a defender answer "well, nobody actually wanted them first." This profile removes that answer. C holds 100 of 303 first choices — the LARGEST first-choice bloc in the field, ahead of D (53), B (51), A (50) and E (49). C is also the Condorcet winner, and not narrowly: C beats A 202-101, B 202-101, D 201-102 and E 201-102 — roughly two to one against every rival. RCV-IRV eliminates C in round 3 and elects D. The elimination order is what does it. E goes first (49), and every one of those ballots reads E>D, so D climbs to 102. A goes next (50), and those ballots read A>B, so B climbs to 101. C, who led the entire count on 100, is now the lowest of the three left and is cut — at which point C's 100 ballots read C>D and hand D the election 202-101. Read this fairly. It is CONSTRUCTED, not a real election, so it proves that RCV-IRV CAN do this, not that it usually does — Condorcet failures showed up in 2 of 182 US RCV elections studied. Its one-dimensional layout (A-B-C-D-E left to right, C in the middle) is the standard spatial model rather than a transcript of any electorate. And the source page is score-voting advocacy with a polemical tone; the PROFILE is arithmetic and reproduces exactly, which is why it is here and the rhetoric is not. Bare letters are deliberate: this is an abstract published illustration, and A-E are the source's own labels. BV-CONFIRMED. Race 1 of live election qycpbx (Test ID BV2281) is these 303 ballots counted by BetterVoting's own IRV tabulator, and it elects D, matching this file exactly; race 2 is the same ballots under Ranked Robin and elects C. tieBreakType 'none' in both. Frozen export: bv2281_qycpbx_bv_export.json. Live on BetterVoting: https://bettervoting.com/qycpbx Live results: https://bettervoting.com/qycpbx/results bv_test_id: BV2281 bv_election_id: qycpbx bv_results_url: https://bettervoting.com/qycpbx/results voting_method: RCV_IRV num_winners: 1 # One-dimensional electorate, A-B-C-D-E left to right; C is the center. # Source: https://rangevoting.org/rangeVirv.html section 12, credited to # Mike Ossipoff. Claim-checked in this folder's README.md. ballots: |- 50:A>B>C>D>E 51:B>A>C>D>E 100:C>D>B>E>A 53:D>E>C>B>A 49:E>D>C>B>A expected_winners: - D # file: bv2281_qycpbx_ossipoff_irv.yaml ====================================================================== TABULATION RESULTS ====================================================================== --- RCV / Instant-Runoff Voting (single winner) --- Ossipoff's 303 — the first-round LEADER is eliminated Tabulating 303 ballots (ranked ballots). ROUND 1 Candidate Votes Status ----------- ------- -------- C 100 Hopeful D 53 Hopeful B 51 Hopeful A 50 Hopeful E 49 Rejected ROUND 2 Candidate Votes Status ----------- ------- -------- D 102 Hopeful C 100 Hopeful B 51 Hopeful A 50 Rejected E 0 Rejected ROUND 3 Candidate Votes Status ----------- ------- -------- D 102 Hopeful B 101 Hopeful C 100 Rejected A 0 Rejected E 0 Rejected FINAL RESULT Candidate Votes Status ----------- ------- -------- D 202 Elected B 101 Rejected C 0 Rejected A 0 Rejected E 0 Rejected Winner(s) — RCV / Instant-Runoff Voting (single winner) D --- Smith Set (the generalized Condorcet winner) --- The smallest group whose every member beats every candidate outside it — the honest answer to "who is even in contention?". Smith set (1 of 5): C Outside (4): A, B, D, E One member ⇒ C is the Condorcet winner, beating every rival head-to-head. RCV-IRV winner D is OUTSIDE the Smith set. ✗ Every member of the set (C) beats D head-to-head, yet RCV-IRV elected D anyway. RCV-IRV is not Smith-efficient (nor Condorcet-efficient) — this is the shape a center squeeze leaves behind. More: 07_Concepts/topics/smith_set.md