======================================================================
SOURCE FILE:     monotonicity_irv_before.yaml
TABULATED FILE:  monotonicity_irv_before_tabulated.txt
======================================================================

election_title: "Non-monotonicity (RCV-IRV) — part 1: baseline, X wins"

scenario_description: |-
  Part 1 of the RCV-IRV monotonicity pair: 34 voters, X wins (Z is eliminated,
  Z's ballots transfer to X). This is the baseline for the paradox — in part 2
  (monotonicity_irv_after.yaml) four voters RAISE X from second to first
  choice, change nothing else, and X LOSES. Keep both files side by side; the
  ballots differ only in those four voters.
paradoxes: [non-monotonicity]
voting_method: RCV_IRV   # RCV-IRV — monotonicity demo (BEFORE: X wins)
num_winners: 1

# Non-monotonicity demo, part 1 of 2 (see _after). Classic 3-candidate example.
# 34 voters. Round 1: X 12, Y 12, Z 10 -> Z eliminated; Z>X transfers -> X 22. X WINS.
# Then in the _after file, 4 voters RAISE X to first (X>Y) and X LOSES — the paradox.
ballots: |-
  12:X>Y
  12:Y>Z
  10:Z>X

expected_winners:
  - X

# file: monotonicity_irv_before.yaml

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TABULATION RESULTS
======================================================================

--- RCV / Instant-Runoff Voting (single winner) ---
  Non-monotonicity (RCV-IRV) — part 1: baseline, X wins
 Tabulating 34 ballots (ranked ballots).

ROUND 1
Candidate      Votes  Status
-----------  -------  --------
Y                 12  Hopeful
X                 12  Hopeful
Z                 10  Rejected

FINAL RESULT
Candidate      Votes  Status
-----------  -------  --------
X                 22  Elected
Y                 12  Rejected
Z                  0  Rejected


Winner(s) — RCV / Instant-Runoff Voting (single winner)
  X

--- Smith Set (the generalized Condorcet winner) ---
The smallest group whose every member beats every candidate outside it —
the honest answer to "who is even in contention?".
   Smith set (3 of 3): X, Y, Z
   Outside (0):        —
   More than one member ⇒ NO Condorcet winner: the top of the tournament is a
   cycle, so the strongest "candidate" is a set, not a person. Which member of
   the set should win is exactly what Minimax / Ranked Pairs / Schulze disagree
   about — see 05_Ranked_Robin/01_Learn/cycle_resolution.md.
   RCV-IRV winner X is INSIDE the Smith set. ✓
      Not guaranteed — RCV-IRV is not Smith-efficient — but it holds here.
   More: 07_Concepts/topics/smith_set.md