====================================================================== SOURCE FILE: p3_manip_star.yaml TABULATED FILE: p3_manip_star_tabulated.txt ====================================================================== election_title: "P3 manipulated — two voters bury their 4th choice and STAR elects their favourite" scenario_description: |- STAR's turn to fail, on the same profile and cheaply. The two sincere Edinburgh>Cork>Athens>Dublin>Bergen voters score their 4th choice Dublin a 0 instead of a 2 — one number each, on one candidate, with their own favourite still a 5 and no favourite betrayal anywhere. Dublin's total drops 23 to 19, which knocks Dublin out of the finalists entirely; the runoff becomes Edinburgh vs Cork and Edinburgh wins 5-2. The two manipulators have replaced Dublin with Edinburgh, their FAVOURITE. This is burial, and it is the honest counterweight to the Copeland and Borda manipulations on this page: Gibbard-Satterthwaite guarantees every reasonable method is manipulable, and that includes both methods this library advocates. voting_method: STAR num_winners: 1 ballots: |- Athens,Bergen,Cork,Dublin,Edinburgh 2:3,0,4,0,5 3:0,3,2,5,4 2:5,4,3,2,0 expected_winners: - Edinburgh # file: p3_manip_star.yaml ====================================================================== TABULATION RESULTS ====================================================================== === P3 manipulated — two voters bury their 4th choice and STAR elects their favourite === STAR's turn to fail, on the same profile and cheaply. The two sincere Edinburgh>Cork>Athens>Dublin>Bergen voters score their 4th choice Dublin a 0 instead of a 2 — one number each, on one candidate, with their own favourite still a 5 and no favourite betrayal anywhere. Dublin's total drops 23 to 19, which knocks Dublin out of the finalists entirely; the runoff becomes Edinburgh vs Cork and Edinburgh wins 5-2. The two manipulators have replaced Dublin with Edinburgh, their FAVOURITE. This is burial, and it is the honest counterweight to the Copeland and Borda manipulations on this page: Gibbard-Satterthwaite guarantees every reasonable method is manipulable, and that includes both methods this library advocates. --- Runoff (Preference) Matrix --- Head-to-head / pairwise comparison Legend: For - Equal Support - Against * indicates Top 2 Finalist | Athens | Bergen | * Cork | Dublin | * Edinburgh | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Athens > | --- | 4 - 0 - 3 | 2 - 0 - 5 | 4 - 0 - 3 | 2 - 0 - 5 | Bergen > | 3 - 0 - 4 | --- | 5 - 0 - 2 | 2 - 2 - 3 | 2 - 0 - 5 | * Cork > | 5 - 0 - 2 | 2 - 0 - 5 | --- | 4 - 0 - 3 | 2 - 0 - 5 | Dublin > | 3 - 0 - 4 | 3 - 2 - 2 | 3 - 0 - 4 | --- | 5 - 0 - 2 | * Edinburgh > | 5 - 0 - 2 | 5 - 0 - 2 | 5 - 0 - 2 | 2 - 0 - 5 | --- | [Condorcet Winner] No Condorcet winner (majority cycle: Athens > Bergen > Cork > Athens) [Divergence from STAR] STAR = Edinburgh Choose-One (Plurality) = Dublin (differs from STAR) RCV-IRV = Dublin (differs from STAR) Approval = Bergen (differs from STAR) Note: no ballots had tied scores, so RCV-IRV vs STAR here is a genuine method difference, not a tie-breaking artifact. Note: Ranked Robin (RCV-RR) agrees with STAR, so RCV-IRV is the lone outlier — the classic center-squeeze signature. Full round-by-round reports (generated for review): RCV-IRV rounds: cases_tabulated/p3_manip_star_RCV-IRV_tabulated.txt --- STAR Voting Method (single winner) --- [STAR Voting] Tabulating 7 ballots. Count × Athens,Bergen,Cork,Dublin,Edinburgh 3 × 0, 3, 2, 5, 4 2 × 3, 0, 4, 0, 5 2 × 5, 4, 3, 2, 0 [Score Distribution] (how many ballots gave each star rating) Score Candidate 5 4 3 2 1 0 | Total Avg Athens 2 0 2 0 0 3 | 16 2.3 Bergen 0 2 3 0 0 2 | 17 2.4 Cork 0 2 2 3 0 0 | 20 2.9 Dublin 3 0 0 2 0 2 | 19 2.7 Edinburgh 2 3 0 0 0 2 | 22 3.1 [STAR Voting: Scoring Round] The two highest-scoring candidates advance to the next round. Edinburgh -- 22 -- First place Cork -- 20 -- Second place Dublin -- 19 Bergen -- 17 Athens -- 16 Edinburgh and Cork advance. [STAR Voting: Automatic Runoff Round] The candidate preferred in the most head-to-head matchups wins. Edinburgh -- 5 -- First place Cork -- 2 Equal Support -- 0 Edinburgh wins. Runoff math: 7 ballots cast − 0 Equal Support (no preference between the two finalists) ─ 7 voters with a preference (majority = 4) Edinburgh 5 (71%) · Cork 2 (29%) [STAR Voting: Winner — STAR Voting Method (single winner)] Edinburgh