election_title: "Successive elimination Ex.10 — District II: a single voter, C wins"
scenario_description: |-
  District II of Felsenthal's successive-elimination reinforcement example. Source: Dan S. Felsenthal (2010), Appendix A4, Example 10.
  One voter, ranking C>D>B>A. With a single ballot every pairwise majority is that voter's own preference, so the agenda B vs D, winner vs A, winner vs C runs D beats B 1:0, D beats A 1:0, C beats D 1:0 and C — the voter's first choice — is elected. C is trivially the Condorcet winner.
  The one-voter district is not a mistake or a simplification: it is the smallest thing that can be amalgamated with District I, and Felsenthal uses it precisely because nothing about it is controversial. Both districts elect C. Their union (succ_elim_ex10_amalgamated.yaml) ties in every round, and under one tie-break reading elects B, which is the reinforcement failure.
  Labels are Felsenthal's own, capitalized, so the case can be read beside the paper's table.
  Tabulated as Ranked Robin, which also elects C — with one ballot there is nothing for the two methods to disagree about. Run the procedure with tools_adam/pref_voting_tabulation_engine/successive_elimination_report.py --agenda B,D,A,C.
paradoxes: [multiple-districts]
voting_method: RankedRobin
num_winners: 1
ballots: |-
  1:C>D>B>A
expected_winners:
  - C

# file: succ_elim_ex10_district2.yaml