====================================================================== SOURCE FILE: b38b7fg_districting_south.yaml TABULATED FILE: b38b7fg_districting_south_tabulated.txt ====================================================================== bv_test_id: BV2274 bv_election_id: 38b7fg bv_results_url: https://bettervoting.com/38b7fg/results election_title: "Two chapters, one delegate — Southside chapter (4 members)" scenario_description: |- Part of the districting-cost trio. Two chapters of one club elect a single national delegate. Ana is adored in Northside and unknown in Southside; Beto is the mirror image; Cleo is everybody's solid second. Counted chapter by chapter, Cleo wins NEITHER — so a delegate chosen from the chapter winners is Ana or Beto. Counted as one electorate, Cleo wins outright, and she is also the highest-welfare candidate (33 points to Ana's 23 and Beto's 19) and the Condorcet winner. That gap is the distortion of distributed voting, made countable. Companion concept page: 07_Concepts/topics/distributed_voting_distortion.md Live on BetterVoting (Test ID BV2274): https://bettervoting.com/38b7fg/results — ONE election carries all three counts as three races. The chapter races hold all nine papers, with the other chapter's members leaving the contest blank; a blank scores 0, so every total matches this file exactly. voting_method: STAR num_winners: 1 ballots: |- Ana,Beto,Cleo 0,5,3 0,5,3 0,5,3 0,4,5 expected_winners: - Beto # file: b38b7fg_districting_south.yaml ====================================================================== TABULATION RESULTS ====================================================================== === Two chapters, one delegate — Southside chapter (4 members) === Part of the districting-cost trio. Two chapters of one club elect a single national delegate. Ana is adored in Northside and unknown in Southside; Beto is the mirror image; Cleo is everybody's solid second. Counted chapter by chapter, Cleo wins NEITHER — so a delegate chosen from the chapter winners is Ana or Beto. Counted as one electorate, Cleo wins outright, and she is also the highest-welfare candidate (33 points to Ana's 23 and Beto's 19) and the Condorcet winner. That gap is the distortion of distributed voting, made countable. Companion concept page: 07_Concepts/topics/distributed_voting_distortion.md Live on BetterVoting (Test ID BV2274): https://bettervoting.com/38b7fg/results — ONE election carries all three counts as three races. The chapter races hold all nine papers, with the other chapter's members leaving the contest blank; a blank scores 0, so every total matches this file exactly. --- Runoff (Preference) Matrix --- Head-to-head / pairwise comparison Legend: For - Equal Support - Against * indicates Top 2 Finalist | Ana | * Beto | * Cleo | ----------------------------------------------------- Ana > | --- |0 - 0 - 4 |0 - 0 - 4 | * Beto > | 4 - 0 - 0 | --- |3 - 0 - 1 | * Cleo > | 4 - 0 - 0 |1 - 0 - 3 | --- | [Condorcet Winner] Condorcet Winner: Beto — matches the STAR winner [Condorcet Loser] Condorcet Loser: Ana — loses every head-to-head matchup --- STAR Voting Method (single winner) --- [STAR Voting] Tabulating 4 ballots. Count × Ana,Beto,Cleo 3 × 0, 5, 3 1 × 0, 4, 5 [Score Distribution] (how many ballots gave each star rating) Score Candidate 5 4 3 2 1 0 | Total Avg Ana 0 0 0 0 0 4 | 0 0.0 Beto 3 1 0 0 0 0 | 19 4.8 Cleo 1 0 3 0 0 0 | 14 3.5 [STAR Voting: Scoring Round] The two highest-scoring candidates advance to the next round. Beto -- 19 -- First place Cleo -- 14 -- Second place Ana -- 0 Beto and Cleo advance. [STAR Voting: Automatic Runoff Round] The candidate preferred in the most head-to-head matchups wins. Beto -- 3 -- First place Cleo -- 1 Equal Support -- 0 Beto wins. Runoff math: 4 ballots cast − 0 Equal Support (no preference between the two finalists) ─ 4 voters with a preference (majority = 3) Beto 3 (75%) · Cleo 1 (25%) [STAR Voting: Winner — STAR Voting Method (single winner)] Beto