======================================================================
SOURCE FILE:     b38b7fg_districting_north.yaml
TABULATED FILE:  b38b7fg_districting_north_tabulated.txt
======================================================================

bv_test_id: BV2274
bv_election_id: 38b7fg
bv_results_url: https://bettervoting.com/38b7fg/results

election_title: "Two chapters, one delegate — Northside chapter (5 members)"

scenario_description: |-
  Part of the districting-cost trio. Two chapters of one club elect a single
  national delegate. Ana is adored in Northside and unknown in Southside; Beto
  is the mirror image; Cleo is everybody's solid second. Counted chapter by
  chapter, Cleo wins NEITHER — so a delegate chosen from the chapter winners is
  Ana or Beto. Counted as one electorate, Cleo wins outright, and she is also
  the highest-welfare candidate (33 points to Ana's 23 and Beto's 19) and the
  Condorcet winner. That gap is the distortion of distributed voting, made
  countable. Companion concept page:
  07_Concepts/topics/distributed_voting_distortion.md
  Live on BetterVoting (Test ID BV2274): https://bettervoting.com/38b7fg/results
  — ONE election carries all three counts as three races. The chapter races
  hold all nine papers, with the other chapter's members leaving the contest
  blank; a blank scores 0, so every total matches this file exactly.
voting_method: STAR
num_winners: 1
ballots: |-
  Ana,Beto,Cleo
  5,0,3
  5,0,3
  5,0,3
  4,0,5
  4,0,5
expected_winners:
  - Ana

# file: b38b7fg_districting_north.yaml

======================================================================
TABULATION RESULTS
======================================================================

=== Two chapters, one delegate — Northside chapter (5 members) ===
  Part of the districting-cost trio. Two chapters of one club elect a single
  national delegate. Ana is adored in Northside and unknown in Southside; Beto
  is the mirror image; Cleo is everybody's solid second. Counted chapter by
  chapter, Cleo wins NEITHER — so a delegate chosen from the chapter winners is
  Ana or Beto. Counted as one electorate, Cleo wins outright, and she is also
  the highest-welfare candidate (33 points to Ana's 23 and Beto's 19) and the
  Condorcet winner. That gap is the distortion of distributed voting, made
  countable. Companion concept page:
  07_Concepts/topics/distributed_voting_distortion.md
  Live on BetterVoting (Test ID BV2274): https://bettervoting.com/38b7fg/results
  — ONE election carries all three counts as three races. The chapter races
  hold all nine papers, with the other chapter's members leaving the contest
  blank; a blank scores 0, so every total matches this file exactly.

--- Runoff (Preference) Matrix ---
Head-to-head / pairwise comparison
Legend: For - Equal Support - Against
        * indicates Top 2 Finalist
               |   * Ana    |    Beto   |  * Cleo   |
-----------------------------------------------------
       * Ana > |    ---     |5 - 0 - 0  |3 - 0 - 2  |
        Beto > | 0 - 0 - 5  |   ---     |0 - 0 - 5  |
      * Cleo > | 2 - 0 - 3  |5 - 0 - 0  |   ---     |

[Condorcet Winner]
  Condorcet Winner: Ana — matches the STAR winner

[Condorcet Loser]
  Condorcet Loser: Beto — loses every head-to-head matchup

--- STAR Voting Method (single winner) ---
[STAR Voting]
 Tabulating 5 ballots.
Count × Ana,Beto,Cleo
    3 ×   5,   0,   3
    2 ×   4,   0,   5

[Score Distribution] (how many ballots gave each star rating)
                Score
Candidate  5  4  3  2  1  0  | Total   Avg
Ana        3  2  0  0  0  0  |    23   4.6
Beto       0  0  0  0  0  5  |     0   0.0
Cleo       2  0  3  0  0  0  |    19   3.8

[STAR Voting: Scoring Round]
 The two highest-scoring candidates advance to the next round.
   Ana           -- 23 -- First place
   Cleo          -- 19 -- Second place
   Beto          --  0
 Ana and Cleo advance.

[STAR Voting: Automatic Runoff Round]
 The candidate preferred in the most head-to-head matchups wins.
   Ana           -- 3 -- First place
   Cleo          -- 2
   Equal Support -- 0
 Ana wins.
   Runoff math:
     5  ballots cast
   − 0  Equal Support (no preference between the two finalists)
     ─
     5  voters with a preference  (majority = 3)
           Ana 3 (60%)  ·  Cleo 2 (40%)

[STAR Voting: Winner — STAR Voting Method (single winner)]
 Ana