election_title: "Chicken / Burr dilemma — STAR resolves it (allies A & B beat C; A wins honestly)"

scenario_description: |-
  The chicken (a.k.a. Burr) dilemma from Jameson Quinn's strategic-pathology set. Two
  similar candidates A and B must team up to beat a third, C, whom the majority opposes:
    35: A>B>C (A9 B8 C0)   25: B>A>C (A8 B9 C0)   40: C (C9, A0 B0)
  Under APPROVAL voting this is a trap: if the 60 A/B voters honestly approve both A and
  B, the result is an exact 60-60 A/B TIE (the "Burr dilemma", after the 1800 Jefferson-
  Burr tie) — and each side is tempted to bullet-vote only its favorite, a slippery slope
  that can hand the win to C if too many defect. See the companion chicken_approval.yaml.
  STAR removes the slope. Scored honestly on 0-5, A and B voters give BOTH allies high
  marks (no bullet needed — the runoff, not the sum, decides between them). C is beaten
  in the scoring round (A 275, B 265, C 200), and A — the honest pairwise winner — takes
  the runoff 35-25. Honesty is safe. The [Divergence from STAR] block confirms Ranked
  Robin also elects A. Concept: ../../07_Concepts/topics/strategic_pathologies.md.

video_script: |-
  A and B are allies; together they crush C, but they have to cooperate. Under approval
  it's a game of chicken: approve both and you might tie; bullet-vote and you might win —
  or, if both sides bullet, hand it to C. STAR ends the standoff. Score both allies high;
  the runoff sorts A from B by real preference, so there's no reason to bullet. C loses,
  A wins, nobody had to blink.

paradoxes: [condorcet-winner]
voting_method: STAR
num_winners: 1

ballots: |-
  Count:A,B,C
  35:5,4,0   # A > B > C
  25:4,5,0   # B > A > C
  40:0,0,5   # C

expected_winners:
  - A

# file: chicken_star.yaml