======================================================================
SOURCE FILE:     bpv_bakery_seat1_c4_b12.yaml
TABULATED FILE:  bpv_bakery_seat1_c4_b12_tabulated.txt
======================================================================

election_title: "Block preferential voting — seat 1 of 2 (bakery co-op board)"

scenario_description: |-
  BLOCK PREFERENTIAL VOTING (also called preferential block voting) is the
  winner-take-all, multi-seat version of instant runoff: run a full IRV count,
  seat the winner, strike that winner from every ballot, and run IRV again for
  the next seat. Every voter helps decide every seat, so it is majoritarian —
  NOT proportional, and not STV.
  This file is SEAT 1: an ordinary RCV-IRV count on the whole 12-voter, four
  candidate field. A 7-voter savoury-free majority (5 Almond-first + 2 Brioche
  first) faces a 5-voter Croissant/Danish minority.
  Round 1: Almond 5, Croissant 5, Brioche 2, Danish 0. Textbook Hare would drop
  Danish alone (nothing to transfer), then Brioche, whose 2 ballots move to
  Almond for 7 of 12 — a majority — and the first seat. The vendored pyrankvote
  BATCHES the two: Brioche and Danish are both marked Rejected in round 1, since
  their 2 combined votes cannot catch either leader. Same winner, one fewer
  round printed.
  Seat 2 continues in bpv_bakery_seat2_c3_b12.yaml, on these same ballots with
  Almond struck out. The pair together IS one block-preferential count.
  Lesson: 06_Other/RCV_IRV/concepts/variants/RCV-IRV-block-preferential.md

voting_method: RCV_IRV
num_winners: 1

ballots: |-
  5:Almond>Brioche>Croissant>Danish
  2:Brioche>Almond>Croissant>Danish
  5:Croissant>Danish>Almond>Brioche

expected_winners:
- Almond

# file: bpv_bakery_seat1_c4_b12.yaml

======================================================================
TABULATION RESULTS
======================================================================

--- RCV / Instant-Runoff Voting (single winner) ---
  Block preferential voting — seat 1 of 2 (bakery co-op board)
 Tabulating 12 ballots (ranked ballots).

ROUND 1
Candidate      Votes  Status
-----------  -------  --------
Almond             5  Hopeful
Croissant          5  Hopeful
Brioche            2  Rejected
Danish             0  Rejected

FINAL RESULT
Candidate      Votes  Status
-----------  -------  --------
Almond             7  Elected
Croissant          5  Rejected
Brioche            0  Rejected
Danish             0  Rejected


Winner(s) — RCV / Instant-Runoff Voting (single winner)
  Almond

--- Transfers and inactive ballots (what the round tables leave out) ---
The tables above give each candidate's round total but not where a
transferred vote came FROM, nor how many ballots stopped counting.
Both are recomputed from the ballots, using the eliminations the
count above actually made.

ROUND 1 — 12 of 12 ballots still active; majority = 7
   Danish eliminated with 0:
      → (held no ballots)
   Brioche eliminated with 2:
      → Almond                    2

FINAL ROUND — 12 of 12 ballots still active; majority = 7
   Almond                    7  (58.3% of the still-active)  ← elected
   Croissant                 5  (41.7% of the still-active)
   Never exhausted, never transferred:
      5 ballots held by Croissant carried a lower ranking that was never read
      (the count stopped here, so those preferences did nothing).

Inactive ballots at the final round: 0 of 12 (0.0%).
   Almond's 7 is a majority of the 12 still active AND of all 12 cast (58.3%).

--- Smith Set (the generalized Condorcet winner) ---
The smallest group whose every member beats every candidate outside it —
the honest answer to "who is even in contention?".
   Smith set (1 of 4): Almond
   Outside (3):        Brioche, Croissant, Danish
   One member ⇒ Almond is the Condorcet winner, beating every rival head-to-head.
   RCV-IRV winner Almond is INSIDE the Smith set. ✓
      Not guaranteed — RCV-IRV is not Smith-efficient — but it holds here.
   More: 07_Concepts/topics/smith_set.md