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SOURCE FILE:     min_pr_c3_b2.yaml
TABULATED FILE:  min_pr_c3_b2_tabulated.txt
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election_title: The smallest divergence — Proportional STAR (Allocated Score)
scenario_description: >
  Two voters, three candidates, two seats — the smallest election in which
  Bloc STAR and Proportional STAR (Allocated Score) fill the council
  differently. Identical ballots to min_bloc_c3_b2.yaml; only the count differs.
  Both methods agree that Ben takes the first seat. They disagree about the
  second, and the reason is the whole difference between the two methods:
  Bloc lets the voter who already got Ben pick the second seat too, while
  Proportional STAR considers that voter represented and hands the second
  seat to the voter who has nobody yet.
voting_method: allocated
num_winners: 2
ballots: |-
  Ana,Ben,Cleo
  0,0,1   # Voter 1 — likes only Cleo, and only mildly
  2,3,0   # Voter 2 — prefers Ben, then Ana
expected_winners: [Ben, Cleo]

# file: min_pr_c3_b2.yaml

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TABULATION RESULTS
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=== The smallest divergence — Proportional STAR (Allocated Score) ===
  Two voters, three candidates, two seats — the smallest election in which Bloc STAR and Proportional STAR (Allocated Score) fill the council differently. Identical ballots to min_bloc_c3_b2.yaml; only the count differs. Both methods agree that Ben takes the first seat. They disagree about the second, and the reason is the whole difference between the two methods: Bloc lets the voter who already got Ben pick the second seat too, while Proportional STAR considers that voter represented and hands the second seat to the voter who has nobody yet.

--- Preference Matrix ---
Head-to-head / pairwise comparison
Legend: For - Equal Support - Against
        Informational only — not part of the 2-winner count below,
        so no Top-2 finalists are marked.
               |     Ana    |    Ben    |    Cleo   |
-----------------------------------------------------
         Ana > |    ---     |0 - 1 - 1  |1 - 0 - 1  |
         Ben > | 1 - 1 - 0  |   ---     |1 - 0 - 1  |
        Cleo > | 1 - 0 - 1  |1 - 0 - 1  |   ---     |

[Condorcet Winner]
  No strict Condorcet winner; unbeaten candidates: Ben, Cleo (pairwise ties)

[Condorcet Loser]
  No strict Condorcet loser; jointly weak Condorcet losers: Ana, Cleo (winless — pairwise ties)

--- Allocated Score Voting Method (2 winners) ---
[Allocated Score Voting]
 Tabulating 2 ballots to fill 2 seats.
Ana,Ben,Cleo
  0,  0,   1
  2,  3,   0

[Score Distribution] (how many ballots gave each star rating)
                Score
Candidate  5  4  3  2  1  0  | Total   Avg
Ana        0  0  0  1  0  1  |     2   1.0
Ben        0  0  1  0  0  1  |     3   1.5
Cleo       0  0  0  0  1  1  |     1   0.5
 Hare quota is 1.

[Allocated Score Voting: Round 1]
 The highest-scoring candidate wins a seat.
   Ben           -- 3 -- First place
   Ana           -- 2
   Cleo          -- 1
 Ben wins a seat.

[Allocated Score Voting: Round 1: Ballot allocation round]
 Allocating 1 ballots.

[Allocated Score Voting: Round 1: Ballot allocation round: Round 1]
 Allocating 1 ballot at score 3.

[Allocated Score Voting: Round 2]
 Tabulating 1 remaining ballots.
Ana,Ben,Cleo
  0,  0,   1
  2,  3,   0

[Score Distribution] (how many ballots gave each star rating)
                Score
Candidate  5  4  3  2  1  0  | Total   Avg
Ana        0  0  0  1  0  1  |     2   1.0
Ben        0  0  1  0  0  1  |     3   1.5
Cleo       0  0  0  0  1  1  |     1   0.5
 The highest-scoring candidate wins a seat.
   Cleo          -- 1 -- First place
   Ana           -- 0
 Cleo wins a seat.

[Allocated Score Voting: Winners — Allocated Score Voting Method (2 winners)]
 Ben
 Cleo