election_title: "Hamlin & Hua §4.1 — the approval count as printed: B wins with 100%"

scenario_description: |-
  The worked example from section 4.1 ("The majority criterion") of Hamlin, A. &
  Hua, W. (2023), "The case for approval voting," Constitutional Political
  Economy 34: 335-345 — reproduced exactly as printed, candidate labels and all.

  The paper's assumed preferences:
    60 voters: A > B > C
    30 voters: B > C > A
    10 voters: C > B > A
  and the approval ballots it assumes those voters cast (each bloc approves its
  top two):
    60 voters: A + B
    30 voters: B + C
    10 voters: C + B

  A is the first choice of 60% of voters, so the majority criterion says A must
  win. B is approved on every ballot and wins with 100% approval. The paper
  concedes the failure and argues it is of trivial consequence; this folder
  runs the argument.

  Note what the approval ballots can no longer distinguish: the 30 B>C>A voters
  and the 10 C>B>A voters cast IDENTICAL ballots, so the engine collapses them
  to a single 40-voter row. That erasure is the lesson, not a display quirk.

  Claim-check page: ../../../04_Approval/01_Learn/hamlin_hua_2023.md
  Set overview: ../README.md

voting_method: Approval
num_winners: 1
paradoxes: [majority-failure, condorcet-winner]

ballots: |-
  Count:A,B,C
  60:1,1,0   # A > B > C — approves A and B
  30:0,1,1   # B > C > A — approves B and C
  10:0,1,1   # C > B > A — approves C and B

expected_winners:
  - B

# file: hh41_01_approval_as_printed.yaml