====================================================================== SOURCE FILE: RCV_ballot_example.yaml TABULATED FILE: RCV_ballot_example_tabulated.txt ====================================================================== election_title: "RCV-IRV — a basic ranked-ballot example (3 candidates)" scenario_description: |- A first ranked-ballot count: 100 voters, three candidates, weighted rows like "40:A>C>B". A leads with 40 first choices but no majority; C (25) is eliminated, C's ballots transfer to A, and A wins 65-35. Use it to learn the round-by-round report before the pathology cases (center_squeeze, monotonicity, summability in method_comparisons/) show what elimination order can do. voting_method: RCV_IRV # RCV-IRV Example - Single-winner num_winners: 1 ballots: |- 40:A>C>B 35:B>C>A 25:C>A>B expected_winners: - A # file: RCV_ballot_example.yaml ====================================================================== TABULATION RESULTS ====================================================================== --- RCV / Instant-Runoff Voting (single winner) --- RCV-IRV — a basic ranked-ballot example (3 candidates) Tabulating 100 ballots (ranked ballots). ROUND 1 Candidate Votes Status ----------- ------- -------- A 40 Hopeful B 35 Hopeful C 25 Rejected FINAL RESULT Candidate Votes Status ----------- ------- -------- A 65 Elected B 35 Rejected C 0 Rejected Winner(s) — RCV / Instant-Runoff Voting (single winner) A --- Smith Set (the generalized Condorcet winner) --- The smallest group whose every member beats every candidate outside it — the honest answer to "who is even in contention?". Smith set (1 of 3): C Outside (2): A, B One member ⇒ C is the Condorcet winner, beating every rival head-to-head. RCV-IRV winner A is OUTSIDE the Smith set. ✗ Every member of the set (C) beats A head-to-head, yet RCV-IRV elected A anyway. RCV-IRV is not Smith-efficient (nor Condorcet-efficient) — this is the shape a center squeeze leaves behind. More: 07_Concepts/topics/smith_set.md