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SOURCE FILE:     ex08_minimal_reversal_2c.yaml
TABULATED FILE:  ex08_minimal_reversal_2c_tabulated.txt
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election_title: "Exercise 8 — a smallest runoff reversal (sample solution, two candidates)"

scenario_description: |-
  A sample solution to the construction exercise ex08_build_a_reversal.md:
  the smallest election this repo knows where the score leader loses the
  automatic runoff. Three voters, two candidates. B piles up points from
  two friendly-but-not-first ballots (B 13, A 10) — yet a 2-1 majority
  scores A above B, so A wins the runoff. Score voting and majority rule
  disagree in the purest possible form; STAR sides with the majority.
  (With only two candidates the finalist matrix is trivial, so
  show_matrix is off per house style.)
voting_method: STAR
num_winners: 1
ballots: |-
  A,B
  5,4 # two voters: A first, B a friendly 4
  5,4
  0,5 # one voter: B only
expected_winners:
  - A

# file: ex08_minimal_reversal_2c.yaml

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TABULATION RESULTS
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=== Exercise 8 — a smallest runoff reversal (sample solution, two candidates) ===
  A sample solution to the construction exercise ex08_build_a_reversal.md:
  the smallest election this repo knows where the score leader loses the
  automatic runoff. Three voters, two candidates. B piles up points from
  two friendly-but-not-first ballots (B 13, A 10) — yet a 2-1 majority
  scores A above B, so A wins the runoff. Score voting and majority rule
  disagree in the purest possible form; STAR sides with the majority.
  (With only two candidates the finalist matrix is trivial, so
  show_matrix is off per house style.)

--- Runoff (Preference) Matrix ---
Head-to-head / pairwise comparison
Legend: For - Equal Support - Against
        * indicates Top 2 Finalist
               |    * A     |   * B     |
-----------------------------------------
         * A > |    ---     |2 - 0 - 1  |
         * B > | 1 - 0 - 2  |   ---     |

[Condorcet Winner]
  Condorcet Winner: A — matches the STAR winner

[Condorcet Loser]
  Condorcet Loser: B — loses every head-to-head matchup — elected by Approval!

[Divergence from STAR]
  STAR     = A
  Approval = B   (differs from STAR)

[Runoff Reversal]
 - Score Round Winner(s) = (B)
 - Runoff Round Winner   = (A)
  Candidate B earned the highest total score, but
  Candidate A won the automatic runoff — not a malfunction,
  STAR working as designed: the runoff elects the finalist preferred
  by the majority (of voters with a preference).


--- STAR Voting Method (single winner) ---
[STAR Voting]
 Tabulating 3 ballots.
Count × A,B
    2 × 5,4
    1 × 0,5

[Score Distribution] (how many ballots gave each star rating)
                Score
Candidate  5  4  3  2  1  0  | Total   Avg
A          2  0  0  0  0  1  |    10   3.3
B          1  2  0  0  0  0  |    13   4.3

[STAR Voting: Scoring Round]
 The two highest-scoring candidates advance to the next round.
   B             -- 13 -- First place
   A             -- 10 -- Second place
 B and A advance.

[STAR Voting: Automatic Runoff Round]
 The candidate preferred in the most head-to-head matchups wins.
   A             -- 2 -- First place
   B             -- 1
   Equal Support -- 0
 A wins.
   Runoff math:
     3  ballots cast
   − 0  Equal Support (no preference between the two finalists)
     ─
     3  voters with a preference  (majority = 2)
           A 2 (67%)  ·  B 1 (33%)

[STAR Voting: Winner — STAR Voting Method (single winner)]
 A